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ABSTRACT 
  Beyond the Demographic Transition:  
The Case of Japan 
 
by 
 
Mary Beth Horiai 
 
Dr. Dennis Pirages, Thesis Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 A combination of declining birthrates and increasing life expectancy in industrial 
countries has led to aging populations. In addition, more rapidly declining birth rates 
combined with only slowly increasing life spans has led to declining populations in some 
countries. These continuing demographic shifts are likely to be accompanied by 
economic, political and social changes. Japan is unique relative to other countries in four 
ways: 1) it has reached the condition of aging faster than any other industrialized country, 
2) it has the highest life expectancy rate among major industrialized countries, 3) the 
proportion of elderly population (over 65) is the highest and 4) it has the highest 
projected population decline between now and 2050. None of these shifts augurs well for 
Japan’s social, economic and political future. There are no easy solutions to these 
emerging problems. While population aging and decline are related issues, they create 
different dilemmas, such as a shrinking work force, total population decline and lack of
necessary economic and societal infrastructure to support a larger elderly population and 
therefore each requires different solutions. This paper will attempt to answer which 
dilemma(s) the Japanese government, bureaucracies and businesses are focusing on and 
to what degree? This is accomplished by reviewing three types of responses: incr ased 
immigration, pro-natalist incentives, and the changing nature of the work force and 
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determining what responses are salient and show the most support by policy and that
policies potential success. It is highly unlikely that Japan will attempt to deal with these 
challenges through increasing immigration, nor is it likely that the Japanese birth rate will 
substantially increase. A closer look then is made at the changing nature of the work 
force in Japan. In what ways is the labor force changing? How do these changes 
potentially affect family structure, gender roles and generational obligations? Japan is an 
important laboratory in which to study the effects of these demographic changes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Japan may be the first advanced economy to accept a “gentle decline” and settle 
into a “reasonably comfortable way of life,” with an inward focus due to the effects of 
population aging and decline (Tricks, 2010). This was not the intended post World War II 
direction of Japan, nor any other Western state. Although Japan has endured nearly two 
“lost decades,” demographic shifts, among other factors have situated Japan, as well as 
many other developed and developing countries in a position to consider a new social, 
political and economic paradigm. This paradigm is likely to involve adjusting directions 
of policy-making, redefining the nature of the workforce and changing social norms 
regarding gender, inter-generational relationships and family structures.  
 Japan is chosen for this single case study because it is unique, relative to other 
countries in four specific ways. First, it has reached the condition of aging faster than any 
other industrialized country. The population of 65 years and over has grown from 7 
percent to 14 percent in 25 years, compared to France taking 115 years, Sweden 85 years 
and Canada 65 years (Komine and Kabe, 2009: 31). Second, Japan has the highest life 
expectancy rate among major industrialized countries. Japan’s average life expectancy 
rate is 82.25, with males and females at 78.96 and 85.72, respectively (CIA, 2011). Third, 
the proportion of elderly population (over 65) is the highest in Japan. As of 2009, 23 
percent of Japan’s population was 65 years or older. And finally, Japan shows the highest 
percentage of potential decline between now and 2050 (Population Reference Bureau, 
2010). These combined conditions have put Japan in a more urgent position to create and 
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implement policies and changes to mitigate the new challenges arising from these 
demographic shifts.  
 The relevance of this topic and the need for urgent coordinated attention within 
countries can be seen in plethora of recent articles and studies used in this paper. 
Numerous popular media articles and special issues also have been recently published. 
These articles all highlight the challenges facing declining and grayin  societies and 
future struggles maintaining global political, economic and social stability.  
 For example, global population aging and decline were topics featured in the firs  
Foreign Affairs issue of 2010. Author Jack Goldstone warns that, “twenty-first century 
international security will depend less on how many people inhabit the world than on 
how the global population is composed and distributed” (2010: 31). National 
Geographic’s first publication of 2011 titles, Population 7 Billion: How your world will 
change, highlights this direction. The articles author explains how countries with growing 
elderly cohorts and diminishing overall populations pose more of a challenge than the 
concern for population growth. The population explosion was not even on the agenda of 
the most recent gathering of world demographers, being replaced by concerns of aging 
and decline (Kunzig, 2011: 61).  
 In several other articles the focus is on Japan. Foreign Policy covered the “Gray 
Menace,” and questioned whether Japan’s aging and declining population is good for the 
United States (Glosserman and Tsunoda, 2009). The November 2010 issue of the 
Economist reviewed Japan’s potential responses and claims that Japan could be “a test 
case of how big countries across the world should handle ageing and population decline” 
(Tricks, 2010: 3). Most recently, the spring 2011 edition of Japan Spotlight published by 
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the Japan Economic foundation is dedicated to Japan’s “Aging Society” with most of the 
articles focusing on turning the challenges of aging societies into opportunities (Haraoka, 
2011).  
 In the last two centuries many developed and developing countries have used 
economic power and growth as a way of defining progress. While not in all countries, 
some studies show that when certain conditions are present such as expenditures on 
education, higher investments and savings and adequate supporting policies, economic 
growth can be spurred by population growth (Headey and Hodge, 2009: 235-236). 
Conversely, the momentum of population growth at times has created a concern for 
growing beyond the capacity to sustain societies within nature’s physical limits. 
However, as the industrial revolution progressed, developing countries began to follow a 
demographic pattern known as the demographic transition. Although early demographic 
transition theorist such as Warren Thompson, Adolphe Landry and A.M. Carr-Saunders 
separately speculated that populations would follow only three stages, later, it became 
evident that additional stages were needed to explain the continuation of declining 
fertility and mortality rates. What is not found in the literature was that the combination 
of ever-increasing life expectancy and continued falling fertility rates would manifest in 
population aging and decline. These conditions potentially create economic burdens, as 
well as political and social challenges that have no precedents. 
 Demographic transition theory is used to first question the new demographic 
stages of aging and decline that many countries are approaching and, second, to bri g 
new understanding to the present body of knowledge regarding the relationship between 
developing societies and changes in fertility rates and life expectancy. The history of the 
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demographic transition has experienced many variations regarding the number of stages 
in its model, the factors or variables explaining the demographic movements, as well  
its ability to make future projections. Gradual decline in birthrates and a historically 
lower life expectancy rate were used to project population stabilization. Instead, what 
occurred was severe decline in fertility rates and continued unexpected growth in life 
expectancy. There are three areas of focus in this study. The first area is  brief 
examination of the demographic transition, its evolution and present demographic 
conditions. A fifth stage is discussed based on a new timeline framework suggested by 
economists Komine and Kabe for Japan is used for this study and a few simple 
observations based on the collected data regarding the order of aging and decline of other 
countries will be set forth. The second area of focus is an overall examination of he 
problems facing a growing group of aging and shrinking populations, including and 
especially Japan. Attempts to respond to these challenges by Japan and other affected 
countries will be covered. Finally, Japan is then singled out for closer analyses. A narrow 
examination is made of three specific groups of responses: potential immigration 
responses, pro-natalist responses and the changing nature of the labor force through 
increased use of women, retirees and robots.  
Research Questions 
 In this third area of focus, the nature of Japan’s responses in dealing with the 
challenges of an aging and declining population is examined. While population aging and 
decline are related issues, they create different dilemmas, such as a shrinking work force, 
total population decline and lack of necessary economic and societal infrastructure to 
support a larger elderly population and therefore each requires different solutions or a 
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combination of solutions. In reviewing Japan’s potential and actual responses, the fir t 
question is: which dilemma(s) is (are) the Japanese government, bureaucracies and 
business’ focusing on and to what degree? This is answered first, by reviewing three 
types of responses: increased immigration, pro-natalist incentives, and the changing 
nature of the work force and then, by determining what responses are salient and show 
the most support by policy and that policies potential success. A closer look then is made 
at the changing nature of the work force in Japan. In what ways is the labor force 
changing? How do these changes potentially affect family structure, gender roles and 
generational obligations?    
 After briefly surveying the problems and analyzing the three types of responses, it 
appears that although the Japanese government has taken some steps toward increasing 
population, these measures are not likely to produce a substantial increase to combat 
population decline. According to the number and attempted purpose of the various laws 
passed in the last decade and a half, the government of Japan appears to focus more on 
solving labor and economic issues resulting from population aging and decline interally. 
The internal approach to decline is through pro-natalist measures, with little precedence 
of success from other countries. The internal change in the nature of labor will be 
approached by the technological diffusion of robotics, the utilization of a healthier, 
elderly society with longevity in life and work years, and a surplus of women. And 
finally, changes in the family structure, gender roles and generational obligations are 
expected. 
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Terms and Clarifications  
 While there are various ways to measure population growth, including birth rates 
and fertility rates this paper will refer to the total fertility rate (TFR). According to the 
Populations Reference Bureau, TFR is the average number of children that would be born 
to a woman by the time she ended childbearing if she were to pass through all her 
childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year (2010). 
 At times this paper will refer to a demographic dividend or bonus and a 
demographic onus. The former dividend or bonus is when the relative size of the 
productive-age population increases and the economic burden on this population is small. 
The economy is likely to be energized and this is called the stage of demographic bonus 
(Komine and Kabe, 2009: 25). It can be delivered through a number of mechanisms such 
as labor supply, savings and human capital (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003: 39). The 
demographic onus occurs as the proportion of the aging population grows and the labor 
force declines.   
 An old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population over 65 to the working 
age population (15-64). The ratios are presented as the number of dependents per 100 
persons of working age. Komine and Kabe state that, “[a] country with a high 
dependency ratio can offset the demographic onus through immigration, while out-
migration may dampen the demographic bonus of a country or even lead to a 
demographic onus (2009: 26).” In addition, the terms “graying” and “aging” will be used 
interchangeably. 
 Japan’s demographic challenges and potential responses share some similarities 
with some emerging Asian countries like South Korea, Taiwan and in some instances, 
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China. Historically, they share lasting war memories, which add to their sense of 
nationalism; coupled with xenophobia they could portray similar resistance to open 
immigration measures. Culturally, they share similar gender division of work and family 
roles, along with a history of multi-generational cohabitating and filial responsibility to 
the elderly. Economically, most of these Asian countries have achieved rapid economic 
growth through some form of statism combined with capitalism. Demographically, they 
experienced similar post-war baby booms, declining birthrates and are expected to follow 
suit with Japan with a growing aging population and eventual population decline. 
Although, typically the “tiger” economies refer to South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan, this paper will also consider China when referring to these Asian countries.  
  The concern for declining TFR is based on societies in which the TFR has 
dropped below the replacement rate of 2.1.  The rate of 2.1 is considered the average 
amount of births per childbearing women necessary to maintain equilibrium in a 
population. In more developed societies this rate could be lower due to medical access 
and advances while in less developed societies it could range slightly higher. To date, the 
stabilization of fertility rates around the replacement level has not been achieved 
(Beckman and Aksu-Koc, 2009: 217). 
 While the American baby boom cohort begins to retire this year and economic, 
political and social challenges are expected to continue concerning a growing etirement 
population, the United States remains somewhat of an anomaly. This is primarily due to 
long-term immigration, which is often claimed to keep birthrates high leading to a 
forecast of continued overall population growth. The conditions in the US will be referred 
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to throughout this paper for perspective and comparison purposes. However, the US is 
often not yet among the most affected societies. 
 This paper treats Japan as a unitary actor, yet it is necessary to acknowledge the 
role of various isolated forces. Karel van Wolfen infers that Japan is lacking institut ons 
such as religious groups, visible in the West, that provide alternative bases from which to 
challenge the elite. Although interest groups like farmers’ co-operatives and workers’ 
unions exist, according to van Wolfen they “have been absorbed by the system and 
harnessed to its own aim” (1989:51). Nonetheless, businesses, bureaucracies, unions and 
civil society have played a role in either pushing policy into existence or allowing by 
non-resistance. 
Outline 
 The next chapter starts with a brief history of demographic transition theory and 
covers the transition from the concerns of a “population explosion” to a “population 
implosion.” This discussion is followed by an examination of the two unaccounted for 
conditions in some of the original models of the demographic transition theory; ever-
increasing life expectancy and persistent falling birth rates. Then, t sequence of 
demographic changes offered by Komine and Kabe to explain the order of Japanese 
demographic conditions will be used as the framework for the fifth stage of the 
demographic transition for other countries. The extent of graying and decline in aff cted 
regions including, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia, and emerging Asian 
countries is presented.  
 Chapter three summarizes the economic, political and social challenges creat d by 
population graying and population decline in Japan and in other affected countries. 
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Chapter four reviews the various responses by states to attempt to meet the challenges 
laid out in chapter three. Chapter five returns to the specific questions regarding the 
direction that Japan will likely take in dealing with the challenges of an aging nd 
declining population and the changing nature of the work force.  
 In the conclusion a review will be made of the various policies for the selected 
three groups of responses and an analysis of which dilemma(s) Japan focuses on and to 
what degree. Then a summary is presented of the ways in which the labor force is 
changing and an examination of how these changes potentially affects family structure, 
gender roles and generational obligations.  Finally, an appraisal is made of the 
applicability, if any, of these responses to other countries facing similar situ tions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BEYOND THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
 Thomas Malthus was one of the first scholars to link political economy and 
demography in the late eighteenth century. His famous quote in An Essay on the 
Principle of Population, stating that “the power of population is indefinitely greater than 
the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man,” made clear his belief in the 
relationship between food and population growth (1798: 11). This began a concern for a 
population explosion based on the Malthusian belief that an increase in population is 
limited by the means of food-production and, consequently, an increase in food-
production would result in increasing population. As Malthus examined a simultaneous, 
gradual increase in population and food supply over the period since the agricultural 
revolution, he forecasted a population explosion where the number of people would 
outpace their subsistence to survive.  
 Following Malthus’ footsteps, an American demographer, Warren Thompson, in 
1929 constructed a model depicting three different types of population growth. A few 
years later, in 1934, Adolphe Landry came up with the same basic ideas and three stages 
of population development. Landry expanded on the explanations for declining fertility 
and mortality. Then in 1944, a third demographer, Frank Wallace Notestein, assisted the 
League of Nations in formulating the demographic transition theory (Kirk 1996, 361). 
The eventual model of population change became known as the demographic transition 
model, showing the expected fluctuations in birth and death rates in an industrialized or 
modernizing society as they relate to population growth. Countries undergo systemic 
changes over time based on economic growth and development.  
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 The demographic transition model attempts to describe population change over 
time. It was originally composed of three stages. The first stage, often referred to as the 
pre-modern stage, represented a society with both high fertility and high mortality rates 
and a stable population.  In the second stage, during which urbanizing and 
industrialization increases, mortality begins to decline, with little or no change in fertility, 
and there is a slight increase in population. As the population approaches the mature 
industrial stage, birthrates decline and the momentum allows the population to continue 
to grow.  Demographers eventually started using a fourth stage to describe the pos -
industrial stabilization of population when both mortality and fertility declined. This
paper looks beyond this fourth stage to a fifth stage of aging and decline. 
 There are many variables suspected to cause this transition. Some social 
scientists, such as Cigdem Kagitcibasi, model this transition around cultures and their 
transformations. Kagitcibasi’s model of family change (MFC)1 explains the demographic 
transition as moving from a rural context,2 to families embedded in an urban context.3 
Other social scientists model this transition around processes, as Dirk van de Kaa’s and 
Ron Lesthaeghe’s model of the second demographic transition (SDT) indicates. These 
authors agree that the first demographic transition’s (FDT) three stages provide an 
adequate description valid worldwide. However, they felt a need to explain why 
                                                
1 Kagitcibasi’s Model of Family Change (MFC) was developed to explain the Turkish 
patterns of family systems embedded in specific socio-ecological context (Bekman and 
Aksu-Koc 2009). 
2 Rural context includes extended patrilineal family systems, with wealth flowing from 
children to parents, higher fertility rates, low status of women, and a strong control of 
offspring (Ibid). 
3 An urban context has more of a nuclear family system, with wealth-flowing from 
parents to children, lower fertility rates, increased status of women (better educated), and 
a decreased obedience in child-rearing (Ibid). 
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practically no society had stabilized its fertility rates around the replac ment level.  They 
attempt this by explaining that SDT is where families move to “higher order needs” 
(Maslow, 1954), further secularization, multiple life style options, and a rise in symmetry 
for gender roles, among other reasons. SDT, they predict, also witnesses a decrease in 
marrying and remarrying, an increase in divorces and cohabiting, further decline in 
overall fertility via postponement, and a definitive increase in childlessness (B kman and 
Aksu-Koc 2009). This explanation appears to be the closest fit for the situation in Japan, 
as will be pointed out later. 
  Medical advances and access to better healthcare were obvious and welcome 
causes for decreases in mortality rates. It remains more difficult however to determine the 
cause of falling birthrates. A growing lack of consensus developed for the reasons behind 
decreasing birthrates. There have been multiple revisions of this theory in attempts to 
discern why fertility rates drop.4 Most notably, is Caldwell’s wealth-flows theory where 
typically agrarian societies consider children as laborers. Therefore, wealth flows from 
children (income) to parents. As a society industrializes and education for children 
becomes a major expense and concern, the wealth-flow reverses from parent to child, 
creating an economic disincentive to have children (Caldwell, 1982). 
 In addition to economic, cultural or social reasoning for falling fertility ra es, 
institutional pressures, or lack of, have often been blamed. For example, government 
policies, such as China’s “one-child policy,” have often been used to explain the cause 
for low fertility, however, many other societies have experienced the same phenomenon 
                                                
4 Other theories include: changes in determinants of parents demand for children theory 
or economic approach (Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Barro, 1988); 
diffusion theory or “butterfly effect” (Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996). 
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without such policy. In addition, the lack of religious constraints or pressures has also 
been a consideration. However, predominantly Catholic countries such as Italy, Spain and 
France are not excluded from this drop in birthrates.  
 Arriving at a clear explanation of why fertility has declined is difficult. What is 
clear is the unprecedented change it is causing. Jay Weinstein’s summary is helpful to 
understand the breadth of fertility decline: 
 
Fertility decline, in historical perspective, is an unprecedente and 
dramatic demographic response to an equally dramatic revolution in the 
way people organize their lives. Demographic transition truly reflects 
social and cultural change. With the emergence of industrial society, low 
levels of fertility prevail for the first time in human existence in some 
populations (2010). 
 
Weinstein sheds light on the difficulty of pinpointing causes as the task of isolating 
factors affecting the way people organize their lives across different political, economic 
and cultural backgrounds is daunting.  
 This paper does not take on the task of isolating the cause for fertility decline if 
there even is one cause, however, there are a few points that research has supported. Most 
studies claim some form of education for women is correlated with fertility ate decline 
(Bongaarts, 2003; Weinberger, 1987). This may include education on birth control issues, 
access to higher education or even just basic literacy for women. Economic factors are 
also often cited as causes (Bongaarts, 2003; Bollen, Glanville and Stecklov, 2007). This 
supports the previous statement as statistics show that there is a correlation between an 
increase in education and an increase in income (Bollen, Glanville and Stecklov, 2007).  
 Important for this paper are two consequences of falling fertility rates. The first 
consequence is that the average age of the population begins to rise resulting in an 
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eventual aging population. The second consequence is that as the older population 
eventually dies off, a total decline in the population will result (Sciubba, 2008).  
Although the demographic transition model eased the Malthusian concern of over-reach 
of population growth, and pointed to the benefits of development and economic growth, 
the preceding challenges that have evolved may now be equally disconcerting.  
From Explosion to Implosion 
 Paul Ehrlich is well known for bringing attention to rapid population growth over 
four decades ago when he stated, “[w] e must rapidly bring the world population under 
control, reducing the growth rate to zero or making it go negative” (Ehrlich, 1968: 131). 
His stance was unique for the times, and remains so that if voluntary measures of 
population control are unsuccessful then government controls should be administered in 
methods such as incentives for families to have two or fewer children, and easy access to 
all forms of birth control including abortions and sterilization. Around the same time, 
Garrett Hardin, in his essay, The Tragedy of the Commons a  well as other 
environmentalists were reiterating Malthus’ concern for the carrying capacity of food and 
finite resources (1968). “Restraint” seemed to be the plea of these extremists.  
 In the decades following, many have scoffed at how wrong they were (Goldstone, 
2010, Kirk, 1996). Not only has the human population not run out of food (aggregately), 
nor exhausted all its resources, but also, as this paper supports, the trend is now starting 
to reverse itself in many societies. The decline in birth rates did, however, start after the 
sounding of alarmists like Ehrlich and others. Whether the increase from 4 billion people, 
when The Population Bomb was published, to 7 billion by the end of this year, is 
considered an “explosion” is not for this paper to decide.  
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 There were two unexpected conditions that neither the demographic transition 
theorists, nor the alarmists had counted on. These two conditions were the continued 
increase in life expectancy leading to population aging and continuing decline in fertility
rates beyond the replacement rate, which can lead to total population decline. As 
mentioned earlier, lower mortality rates and longer life spans are larg ly attributed to 
advances in medicine and improved healthcare and sanitation. Admittedly, this does not 
always equate to higher life expectancy rates as in some advanced economies where 
health conditions due to fast food access and inactive life styles such as heart disease and 
diabetes are actually increasing. Many societies may not only experience large elderly 
population but if there is not enough attention to healthy life styles, these large 
populations will become ever more dependent on medical, financial and government 
support. The next section examines these two demographic conditions. 
Increasing Life expectancy 
 Life expectancies are projected to grow considerably in the next four decades.  
The life expectancy at birth in Germany and the US is projected to grow from 78 years in 
2010 to 83 years by 2050.  In France, it is expected to grow from 81 to 87 years.  But in 
Japan life expectancy is expected to grow from 81 years in 2010 to an astonishing 92 
years by 2050 (England, 2002).  A wide disparity still exists, however, with Angola and 
Afghanistan’s rate still in the 30’s and 40’s and Japan along with 30 other countries with 
life expectancy over 80 (CIA, 2011). The latter is considered a positive condition, 
however, many of the retirement calculations and social support systems were built using 
assumptions based on a shorter life span scale. In industrial countries, people can now 
expect to live much longer healthy lives than they could decades ago. In 1950, for 
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example, a 65-year old woman in the United States, Canada, or Sweden could expect to 
live only 15 more years.  By 2000, this had increased to 20 years. Had fertility rates not 
dropped so drastically, higher life expectancy would likely be a more welcomed 
advancement for those societies unprepared for the excess burden on the social security 
and pension systems. 
Falling Birthrates 
 The drop in TFR is not uniform across the globe as well as within countries. 
India, like China, also established somewhat controversial policies in the 1970’s. In India, 
sterilization programs led to dramatic reduction in birth rates overall. India, however, has 
a wide gap between regions. The southern coastal regions, where literacy rates are high, 
have lower fertility rates; some rates are as low as replacement lev l or lower. The 
northern states5 however, continue to maintain the reverse; high fertility rates and low 
literacy rates. In Brazil, a predominantly Catholic country, where the gov rnment never 
promoted family planning experienced birth rate drops. Changing cultural norms, th ough 
access to television is sometimes credited for contributing to these changes. After 
television was introduced in Brazil, province by province, birth rates plummeted soon 
after (Longman 2010). Regardless of causality, fertility rates are declining across the 
globe. 
The Fifth Stage of Demographic Shifts 
 The possible fifth stage in the demographic transition is based on the sequence of 
demographic change forecast for Japan by the Japan Center for Economic Resear h. This 
                                                
5 The northern states in the “Hindi Belt” region have much higher rates: Rajasthan t 4.5, 
Bihar at 4.6 and Uttar Pradesh at 5.2. The southern states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have 
rates of 1.7 and 2.1(Adlakha, 1997: 5). 
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stage has four conditions and starts first with a decline in TFR, which leads to n aging of 
society, followed by the shrinking of its work force and then ultimately resulting in total 
population decline (Komine and Kabe, 2009). The examination of countries that are 
experiencing aging and declining populations, virtually all have reached the first 
condition. Fertility rates in all the countries have dropped well below replacement level 
(see Table 2.1). 
Extent of Graying 
 Although population aging affects nearly all the countries in the world, there are 
differentiations among regional, gender and age cohorts. The pace of population aging is 
faster in developing regions than in developed countries. The world is now a 
demographically divided world; the population of the industrialized “global north” is 
only growing at a meager 0.2 percent annually while population of the “global south” 
continues to grow at a hefty 1.4 percent (Population Reference Bureau, 2010). This 
differential growth continues to give rise to substantial and often troublesome migration 
from rapidly growing to more demographically stable areas of the world. 
 There is even an aging population within the elderly population. The fastest 
growing cohort within the aging population is 80 and older. Women constitute the 
majority of the cohort over 60, outnumbering men, globally, by 66 million (UNDESA, 
2009).  
 The World Population Aging Report considers the process of population aging for 
the whole world. The report claims four major findings. First, aging is “unprecedented” 
in the history of humanity. Second, aging is “pervasive” in where nearly all countries of 
the world are affected. Third, aging is “profound.” The economic, political and social  
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Table 2.1 Total Fertility Rates 
Column1 
TFR 
2010 
Rank 
from 
the 
lowest 
Above 
13% 
Decline 
by 
2050 
Above17%Of 
Pop. 65+ 
2009 
Macao 0.90 1     
Hong Kong 1.04 2     
Singapore 1.10 3     
Taiwan 1.15 4     
Japan 1.20 5 *  *  
S. Korea 1.22 6 *    
Lithuania 1.24 7 *    
Belarus 1.25 8 *    
Bosnia-Herz 1.26 9 *    
Ukraine 1.27 10 *    
Romania 1.27 10 *    
Moldova 1.28 11 *    
Poland 1.29 12 *    
Latvia 1.31 13 *  *  
Italy 1.32 14   *  
Greece 1.37 17   *  
Serbia 1.39 18 *  *  
Austria 1.39 18   *  
Bulgaria 1.41 19 *  *  
Russia 1.41 19 *    
Germany 1.42 20 *  *  
Croatia 1.43 21 *  *  
Estonia 1.43 21   *  
Georgia 1.44 22 *    
Switzerland 1.46 24   *  
Spain 1.47 25   *  
Portugal 1.50 26   *  
Belgium 1.65 35   *  
Sweden 1.67 38   *  
Finland 1.73 43   *  
Denmark 1.74 44   *  
France 1.97 64   *  
Source: CIA World Factbook 
2010         
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impacts are extensive. Finally, aging is  “enduring” and will continue as such a long as 
fertility and mortality rates remain low (UNDESA, 2009). 
 European countries have been among the first to experience graying societie . In 
addition to better healthcare, and sanitation systems, which lead to longer, healthier and 
in most cases wealthier lives, Europe has also experienced a steady drop in birthrates. 
The speed of this aging6 has been quite slow for most of Western Europe; France has 
taken over a century to reach this level, while countries like Sweden have taken around
85 years for this transition to occur. This is compared to a couple decades for countries 
like Japan and South Korea. Europe also reports a 25 percent decrease in marriages and 
an increase in cohabitation, along with a high number of abortions.7 The combination of 
greater life expectancy and sub-replacement level fertility rates, has directly contributed 
to population graying in Europe. 
 While some societies in the EU are in more advance stages of population graying, 
no society has escaped this phenomenon. Countries like Bulgaria and Germany, having 
the fewest number of young people, make it difficult to continue to fund pension and 
healthcare programs. On the other end, Italy and Germany have the largest elderly 
populations, which will also require building up the workforce as well as increased t xes 
and cuts in benefits for a growing elderly population. 
 The percentage of populations 65 and over in a hand-full of Eastern European 
countries has caught up with most of the aging Western European countries (see Table 
                                                
6 The amount of time it takes for the percentage of the 65 and over population to grow 
from 7 percent to 14 percent. 
7 According to the Catholic Human Rights Institute, “abortion, together with cancer, 
emerges as the leading cause of death in Europe, with 1.2 million abortions each year” 
(Golubiewski, 2008:1). 
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2.2). The Eastern European countries on the first two tables have followed the first two 
stages of the Komine and Kabe framework. They all have below replacement fertility
rates and a growing aging society. According to the projected aged dependency ratio for 
2050, the rest  
 
Table 2.2 Graying v. Decline 
% Population Decline (2050) % of Population 65+ (2009) 
Japan -25 Japan 23 
Moldova -24 Italy 20 
Georgia -23 Germany 20 
Ukraine -23 Greece 19 
Bulgaria -22 Sweden 18 
Latvia -20 Denmark 17 
Bosnia-Herz -20 Estonia 17 
Serbia -20 Finland 17 
Russia -18 Latvia 17 
Lithuania -18 Austria 17 
Poland -17 Belgium 17 
Romania -15 France 17 
Croatia -13 Switzerland 17 
South Korea -13 Bulgaria 17 
Germany -13 Croatia 17 
Belarus -13 Portugal 17 
  Serbia 17 
  Spain 17 
Source: “2009 World Population Data Sheet.” Population Reference Bureau, 2009 
 
of the Eastern European countries will face a situation equaling a little more than two 
workers for every retiree (see Table 2.3). It will take these countries considerably less 
time than their Western counterparts to achieve these demographic shifts, giving the state 
as well as individuals less time to prepare appropriate responses. However, countries s ch 
as India and China have not built up generous pension and healthcare entitlement 
programs, making it, on one hand easier for their elderly cohorts to expect less (Shapiro, 
2008: 71-72). 
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 Asia will experience serious challenges due to aging and declining populatins 
yet with much less time to prepare. While in the United States it will take nearly 70 years 
for the percentage of the population 65 and over to double from 7 percent to 14 percent, 
in India, China and Indonesia, the world’s three most populous countries, this doubling 
will occur in about 25 years. Thus nearly 25 percent of China’s population will be over 
65 by  
Table 2.3 Age Dependency Ratios 
Country 2010 2030 2050 
East Asia 0.17 0.26 0.41 
Japan 0.35 0.53 0.76 
S. Korea 0.15 0.36 0.66 
Singapore 0.14 0.46 0.6 
Hong Kong 0.17 0.26 0.59 
China 0.11 0.24 0.39 
Western Europe 0.24 0.36 0.49 
Italy 0.31 0.44 0.64 
Germany 0.31 0.48 0.61 
France 0.26 0.41 0.47 
Switzerland 0.26 0.4 0.46 
Eastern Europe 0.19 0.31 0.46 
Russia 0.18 0.3 0.42 
Belarus 0.19 0.29 0.45 
Poland 0.19 0.35 0.54 
Bosnia-Herz 0.2 0.35 0.55 
Serbia 0.21 0.28 0.4 
Romania 0.21 0.29 0.51 
Ukraine 0.22 0.32 0.46 
Hungary 0.24 0.32 0.47 
Lithuania 0.24 0.35 0.46 
Estonia 0.25 0.33 0.44 
Latvia 0.25 0.33 0.47 
Bulgaria 0.26 0.37 0.59 
Croatia 0.26 0.39 0.52 
United States 0.19 0.32 0.34 
Source: United Nations Data June 18, 2009 
 
 
22 
 
2050 while 20 percent of Indonesia will fall into this category. Globally, by 2050, half of 
all aged persons in the world will be concentrated in Asia. And most of these countries 
lack social safety nets for the elderly and are going to be severely challenged to meet the 
rapidly growing needs of the elderly while the percentage of the population in the labor 
force continues to shrink (Stone, 2010).  
 Several of the smaller Asian countries now have the lowest TFR (See Table 2.1). 
Although, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea still hover around 10 percent of the 
population over 65, they also will face severe graying problems with a much shorter time 
frame to prepare (see Table 2.3). For example, it is projected that the population in 
France 65 and over will reach 20 percent by 2036, having taken 154 years to grow from 7 
percent of the population. This same percentage growth will take South Korea a short 26 
years to reach by 2026 (Kwon, 2009). 
 Although operating from a much stronger economic base than some of the Asian 
countries as well as some of the Eastern European countries, Japan will also face stiff 
challenges from this rapid graying due to the large portion of the population already over 
65.  By 2050 nearly 37 percent of the Japanese population is projected to fall into this 
category.  This represents a jump from17 percent at the turn of the century. Japan is 
unique in that of all the industrialized countries it leads in both graying and projected 
population decline (see Table 2.4). 
 The United States is somewhat of an anomaly, while the first “baby boomers” ar  
set to start retiring in 2011, which will lead to a growing aging population and all its
challenges, the continued influx of immigrants has not only filled the gap of workers but, 
also contributed to an above replacement level fertility rate. The total populati n is 
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expected to grow to 400 million by 2050. Due to the recent economic crisis, there are 
fewer jobs to be filled by immigrants and has consequently led to over a million 
immigrants from Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America returning home in the last two 
years. A Pew Hispanic Center study shows that the number of illegal immigrants thought 
to be entering the United States has declined from 850,000 in the early 2000s to around 
300,000 people annually. Additionally, Mexico too will face the problems of a growing 
aging society very soon. Although there are nine youths for every elderly Mexican over 
65, by 2050 that ratio is expected to equal one to one. Mexico has very few policies in 
place for the elderly leaving them to rely primarily on their families. 
 
Table 2.4 Population Decline 2009-2050 
Country % Decline 2009** 2050** %65+ TFR 2009 
Japan -25 127.6 95.2 23 1.4 
Moldova -24 4.1 3.1 10 1.3 
Georgia -23 4.6 3.5 15 1.4 
Ukraine -23 46 35.3 16 1.4 
Bulgaria -22 7.6 5.9 17 1.5 
Latvia -20 2.3 1.8 17 1.4 
Bosnia-
Herz -20 3.8 3.1 14 
1.2 
Serbia -20 7.3 5.9 17 1.4 
Russia -18 141.8 116.9 14 1.5 
Lithuania -18 3.3 2.7 16 1.5 
Poland -17 38.1 31.8 14 1.4 
Romania -15 21.5 18.1 15 1.3 
Croatia -13 4.4 3.8 17 1.5 
S. Korea -13 48.7 42.3 10 1.2 
Germany -13 82 71.4 20 1.3 
Belarus -13 9.7 8.4 14 1.4 
*Countries with more than one million people 
**Millions 
Source:  “2009 World Population Data Sheet.”  Populations Reference Bureau, 2009 
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 All of these countries have or will soon experience a contraction of the labor force 
as indicated by table 2.3. At which time measures to counteract a shrinking work force 
become important. Options such as increased immigration or increasing the workforce 
from within becomes potentially attractive. The challenges surrounding these responses 
will be expanded on later.  
Extent of Decline 
 Over the next decade and a half most advanced economies8 are expected to see 
their populations decline by several percent. Eastern European countries dominate the list 
of leading countries in decline (see Table 2.4). These declines could approach or exceed 
20 percent of the current populations in Russia, Ukraine, and a few other Eastern 
European countries by 2050. Russia’s aging and declining population is projected to fall 
from 141million people to below 130 million by 2025 (CIA , 2008).  
  Russia’s situation is somewhat unique. Although Russia has moved through an 
industrialization period it also experienced a demographic shock with the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. In addition, there has been an unusual and severe increases in mortality 
rates, especially among working age males, and an extreme drop in fertility rates among 
females. One author fears that, without a viable workforce, and with massive reserves of 
oil, Russia might become an unbalanced petro-state (Lubin, 2010).  
 In addition to the increase in early deaths in males, primarily due to alcoholism, 
liver and heart disease and other issues related to heavy stress, there has also been an 
                                                
8 The populations of the US, Canada, Australia, and a few other industrial states wih 
relatively high immigration rates will continue to grow—the US by more than 40 million, 
Canada by 4.5 million, and Australia by more than 3 million (CIA , 2008). 
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increase in childhood illnesses of about 9.3 percent in the past decade. Twenty percent of 
children experience chronic illnesses; while over half of teenagers have reproductive 
health issues. According to Health Minister Tatyana Golikova, “More intense medical 
examinations of teenagers are planned to start from 2011 with the goal of examining their 
reproductive function and recommending individual medical courses, which would 
identify and treat reproduction problems.” She also highlighted the growing alcohol 
consumption and smoking habits among children (RIA Novosti, 2010: 1). In addition to 
Russia’s projected drop in population, the number of women in their prime child bearing 
years is expected to decrease by 55 percent (CIA, 2008). Overall, Russian deaths 
outnumbered births by nearly 50 percent since 1992 mostly due to poor diet, smoking, 
sedentary lifestyles and alcoholism (Goldstone, 2010). 
 Admittedly, there has not been a uniformed pattern as Komine and Kabe neatly 
demonstrate (2009). Although all the countries that are aging and declining have 
extremely low TFR, not all countries that are declining, particularly in Eastern Europe, 
are presently aging as compared to the western counterparts. The majority of Eastern 
European societies are experiencing the most population decline, however, these same 
countries are expected to converge with the levels of high aged dependency rates in the 
next couple of decades as Western Europe and Japan (Gavrilova and Gavrilov, 2009). 
Nonetheless, projections to 2050 show that across the board these countries will have to 
deal with a little more than two working-age people for every retiree (Table 2.3).  
 Population decline has been lead by Japan starting around 2005, however, South 
Korea and Taiwan are expected to see a decline in population in the next 15 years. While 
better prepared than China, India or Indonesia, these countries will have to act quickly to 
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deal with the challenges brought on by this rapid aging. Overall, South Korea, Singapore, 
Thailand and China will follow Japan’s order of demographic changes (Komine and 
Kabe, 2009). 
 The challenges that both aging and declining populations will bring about will 
threaten economic, political and social systems.9 These consequences beg for a re-
evaluation of economic, social, and political systems. Increased numbers of pensioners 
will require the re-evaluation of social security systems, the shortage of workers will need 
to be addressed, as well as improved infrastructure that will cater to the health and 
medical needs of a growing elderly population. In addition, the dependence on economic 
growth as the priority for societies to thrive will need to be re-examined. 
Japan’s Condition 
 Low fertility rates and high life expectancy have put Japan ahead on both the 
aging and declining fronts. There are many variables contributing to these rat . 
Regarding low fertility rates, these variables include the average age of first marriages, 
the growing percentage of unmarried men and women, the increased number of childless 
women, the timing of when women have their first child and the increase in spacing 
between children. Regarding high life expectancy, some of the factors are economi  
wealth, lifestyle choices, education, environment and access to quality health services.  
 Japan has the highest life expectancy rate among industrialized countries of  85.72 
years for women and 78.96 for men. In addition, Japan’s GDP per capita has remained 
even during two decades of almost no growth. Japan has a high level of literacy and 
                                                
9 A report presented at the European Parliament in Brussels, titled “The Evolution of he 
Family in Europe 2008” warns of the catastrophic consequences of demographic decline 
(Golubiewski, 2008). 
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college graduates and according to the World Health Organization (WHO), ranks at the 
top regarding healthy longevity calculated by considering health and life expectancy 
(AORN, 2000). In addition to these generally positive statistics among the elderly, an 
interesting trend is developing among the younger generation. 
 According to Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the mean age of first 
marriages for men and women in 1950, were 25.9 and 23.0; by 2008 they had increased 
to 30.2 and 28.5 respectively. The percentage of unmarried10 men and women between 
the ages of 30 and 34 has tripled and quadrupled respectively (Wakabayashi and Inada, 
2009). The Japanese Bureau of Statistics at the Ministry of International Affairs and 
Communication reports, more than 54 percent of women in their thirties are single (Mori 
and Scearce, 2009). The percentage of permanent childless women has risen from 7 
percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 2001. Also, women are waiting longer to have their first 
child as well as having wider spaces between children. If these factors, added to th  1.22 
TFR continue unchanged, it has been calculated that the very last Japanese baby will e 
born in the year 2959 (Longman, 2010). 
 Due to these multiple changes affecting Japan’s demographic situation, the country
as a whole is being forced to face its changing future. The responses made by the 
Japanese government and its civil society might be helpful to upcoming graying and 
declining states by imitating successful responses or policies and avoiding unsuccessful 
ones.  
 The sequence of demographic shifts for the fifth stage of population aging and 
                                                
10 Never married women ages 35-39 moved from 3 percent in 1950 to 14 percent in 2000. 
Men moved from 3 percent to 26 percent in that same age cohort and time period 
(Bekman and Aksu-Koc 2009). 
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decline being used as a framework for affected countries presents some consistency. All 
affected countries in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia have lower than 
replacement level birth rates. These same countries are expected to have levels of high 
aged dependency rates in the next couple of decades indicating a growing aging 
population as well as a shrinking of the workforce. Finally, a majority of the countries 
presented here are due to experience population decline. This consistent sequence is 
helpful as warnings to developing countries as they quickly approach these conditions. 
The next chapter is devoted to expanding the challenges that have developed due the 
demographic shifts described above. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CHALLENGES 
“The relative demographic weight of the world’s developed countries will drop by nearly 
25 percent, shifting economic power to the developing nations” (Goldstone, 2010: 32) 
 Since the end of World War II, many industrialized countries benefited from their 
demographic bonus as a result of increases in births, known as “baby booms.” Although 
some developing countries often experience a “youth bulge” which can lead to high 
unemployment and civil unrest, these industrialized countries such as Japan, the United 
States and several Western European countries were able to grow their economies. An 
abundance of labor translated into economic growth. With a large and growing workforce 
entitlement programs theoretically had more contributions than deductions. Although 
there have been studies11 done to suggest the opposite, growth in population is often 
considered necessary for economic growth. The challenges however, presently facing 
aging and declining populations are unprecedented and may call for major shifts on many 
levels. It is expected that these societies will experience a number of social, political and 
economic challenges due to these changing conditions. 
 This chapter reviews the various economic, political and social challenges created 
in aging and declining populations. Conditions in affected countries as well as Jap n are 
discussed. The combined challenges create a starting point to evaluate potential responses 
in the following chapter. 
 
                                                
11 A Rockefeller Report found no convincing economic argument for continued national 
population growth. The health of the economy, the vitality of business and the welfare of 
the average person do not depend on population growth (The Center for Research on 
Population and Security, 1972).  
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Economic Challenges 
 The potential economic challenges that aging and declining populations will 
encounter are widespread, affecting the purses of the individual citizens as well the 
public and private sectors. The “Great Recession” of 2008-2010 forcefully called 
attention to the wide variety of pension and health care obligations that have been 
building in OECD countries.  The demographic and economic assumptions that originally 
supported the creation of these programs have been badly shaken by the combined 
economic recession and accelerating aging in these industrial societies. 
 The economic challenges include the imbalance of contributions from a country’s 
workforce to the demands of pension and healthcare system for the elderly retired 
population. With a declining number of workers to tax and an increasing number of 
elderly to fund, some combination of an increase in taxes or a cut in benefits will be 
necessary. As states take these measures, all workers can expect less income to spend and 
therefore less ability to save. As a nation’s individual savings decrease, so does it’s 
ability to invest domestically or participate in foreign direct investment (FDI) or official 
development assistance (ODA) expenditures, as well as the inability to fund needed 
research and development (R&D) projects. Changes in the public and the private sectors 
will be necessary. Changes in labor practices, such as infusing either low-waged migrants 
or elderly working beyond retirement, will affect wages, which will in turn affect 
individual savings. Finally, maintaining existing pension and healthcare systems will 
become a costly strain on governments. All these economic changes may be determined 
by top-down political actions, private sector decisions, as well as collective social shifts 
in individual lifestyles. 
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Taxes and Benefits 
 For many decades now, countries like Japan have been aware of the need to 
implement measures in dealing with the upcoming imbalances. Raising taxes, whil  
benefiting retirees by keeping the pension systems afloat, creates a growing burden on 
workers. Likewise, cutting benefits creates a feeling to the elderly of being cheated of 
what was promised. 
 In Japan, some estimates have indicated that social security tax rates could 
increase to resemble France’s high rates of over 30 percent (Jones, 1988: 969). Japan’s 
social security is based on a “pay-as-you-go” system, where the working class supports 
the aged generation. The system is in dire need of reform as it puts the entire financial 
burden onto the working cohort. This is evidenced by Japan’s future aged dependency 
ratio (see Table 2.3). Economists such as, Kazumasa Oguro, recommend a “pre-funding” 
system, which would involve some tax increase yet some of the burden would be shared 
by the retirees for the unfunded portions of their pensions (2011: 23; Shapiro, 2008: 70) 
Any change in taxes or benefits will likely involve a struggle between politicians and 
powerful ministries and any movement will depend on which generation’s voice is 
stronger.  
Declining savings and investments 
 Population aging and decline will likely lead to declines in household, private, 
government and national saving rates. In Japan, demographic factors have been isolated 
to account for 2-3 percent of a 9 percent decline in savings during the period of 1990-
2000 (Braun, Ikeda and Joines, 2009: 291). This in turn will lead to the weakening of 
investments both private and public. Although some optimistic authors state that 
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borrowing from abroad can be a solution considering the current fiscal conditions of mo t 
economies, this may not be an option (Horioka, 2010: 46). 
Shrinking Workforce 
 Compounding the growing aging population is the shrinking workforce. This 
situation is without historical precedent and will have a large effect on how fast countries 
grow and the capacities of their governments to meet the needs of tens of millions of new 
elderly people (Shapiro, 2008). The global age dependency ratio has declined from 12 to 
9 potential workers per elderly person over 65 during the period from 1950 to 2009. It is 
projected to drop to 4 potential workers per elderly person over 65 by 2050. Furthermore, 
as we will see in Japan, the drop will be even more extreme. These expected drops would 
have important implications for social security schemes and pensions systems, which 
depend on even flows and often increasing flows of contributions in order to remain 
solvent. 
 The majority of social security systems were set up during a period of 
demographic bonus where the workforce was sizable enough to support the smaller 
elderly population. With growing proportions of populations being 65 and over the 
demographic base of what was originally defined as a demographic “pyramid” with a
solid larger base supporting a diminishing upper group of elderly, has turned into what is
now being termed a demographic “tree” or “kite” (See figure 3.1). The contributions 
from the workforce can no longer support the top-heavy weight of the elderly population.  
 The dilemma of a shrinking labor force is widespread. Germany and France have 
dealt with this over the last couple of decades by increasing immigrants into the  
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 Figure 3.1 Japan Population Pyramid to Population Tree or Kite. 
 
workforce. Much conflict has developed from this issue both in Germany and France 
mainly resulting from the majority of the immigrant population being unskilled workers 
and adding an additional financial burden on society. In contrast to the immigration 
system in the US and Europe, Australia and Canada have adopted a point system where 
immigrants are allowed entry based on their skills and education (Jacoby, 2011). A new 
struggle may develop as more and more advanced economies try to fill their labor 
shortages with skilled workers in this manner. Eventually, all developing stateswill 
experience a shrinking of their labor force in comparison to their dependent elderly
population, as evidenced by the consistent change in both aged dependency ratio and the 
growing proportion of the population 65 and over (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Even China’s 
workforce is projected to contract around 2020 (Shapiro, 2008:58). A Canadian specialist 
warns that, “This is not a remote or abstract crisis. Countries like Canada will soon be 
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fighting to attract anyone we can get to work – and squeezing as much as we can from the 
remaining few” (Saunders, 2010: 1). 
Healthcare and Pension Costs 
 According to the bond-rating agency Standard & Poor’s, most western countries 
will spend between 27 and 30 percent of GDP on the needs of their retirees by 2050. This 
will lead to huge fiscal deficits near 25 percent of GDP and some warn it will “make the 
current crisis seem miniscule by comparison” (Saunders, 2010: 1). Most western 
countries are already struggling with how to compensate for the increase in healthcare 
costs and pension funds. Worse yet are the newly developing countries that lack any kind 
of existing infrastructure. 
 China’s mere population size increases the magnitude of welfare systems that 
need to be in place for this aging population. In China, only a very small percentage of 
workers have any social security benefits and these benefits are usually restricted to the 
military and the elite. China’s near absence of pension and healthcare systems in order to 
support such a large aging population increases its challenges to take care of the lderly 
while remaining a rapidly growing economy. China is now looking to increasing the 
retirement age an additional five years, as well as enrolling young rural wo kers into 
pension plans to build up public funds. However, China may see an increased rate of 
poverty amongst the elderly population within the next couple of decades. 
Political challenges 
 George Magnus states that “Demographic change may not be the most widely 
publicized factor in voters priorities, but it is both a cause and effect of the changing 
political agenda” (2009: 111). The political challenges facing aging and declining 
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societies include potential decisions regarding immigration, security, global leadership, as 
well as domestic spending issues and increased urbanization.  
 France has felt the social and political strains as the costs soar to cover the 
expenses of the growing retiree cohort. France already has the largest percent of payroll 
tax12 covering labor costs due to it having one of the world’s most generous pension 
systems (Shapiro, 2008). France is among the states, which have used an open 
immigration policy in order to fill in the labor gap. There has been notable tension 
between French nationals and immigrant groups, primarily Muslim immigrants, leading 
to protests, riots and assimilation struggles. Integrated problems like these, which affect 
economic, political and social systems, are expected to increase in nearly all advanced 
states.  
Immigration Resistance 
 Although globalization and all its related integration is considered a reality in 
most developed and developing countries, sovereignty and nationalism remain prominent 
in countries. Institutions like the United Nations suggest allowing large numbers of 
migrant workers from developing countries to assist developed societies with aging 
populations (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000). For various reasons such as, possible 
depletion of ethnicity, culture and language countries like France, Germany, Japan and 
the U.S. are resisting further influx of immigrants. This presents a political divide 
between the private sector that welcome the usually cheaper labor and the general public 
that demands assimilation. In addition, rising unemployment due to the current economic 
crisis only increases resistance. 
                                                
12 France’s payroll tax accounts for 38 percent of labor costs, with Italy at 32 percent, 
Germany at 25, Britain at 17 and the United States at 14 percent (Shapiro, 2008: 58). 
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The United Nations has provided forecasts for member countries showing how 
many new immigrants would be needed to maintain their current pension and healthcare 
systems.  In most countries the number of immigrants required would be overwhelmingly 
high.  For example, presently there are around 2.2 million foreigners living in Japan, 
which is about 1.7 percent of the population.  In comparison with France, with a nearly 
10.2 percent immigrant population, and the United States, with nearly 13 percent, this is a 
relatively small number.  But the United Nations has estimated that Japan would need to 
admit around 600,000 new working-age immigrants into the country every year between 
now and 2050 in order to prevent a decline in the working-age population 
(Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000).  If Japan were to follow this path, by 2050 more 
than a third of the population would be of non-Japanese origin. The exploration into 
Japan’s resistance to increased immigration will be taken up further in chapter five. 
Military and Security Issues 
 Typically, states depend on a large youth cohort to draw from to grow its military 
capabilities. In peacetime, among democratic nations this may not be as important. 
However, with a rise in terrorist acts, the changing dynamics in Northeast Asia and a 
global race for rapidly depleting energy resources, military capabilities may compete for 
a nation’s financial support and challenge the funding needed for aging societies. 
 Japan’s security challenges are uniquely strained for two reasons. First, there is 
grave concern regarding the growing nuclear capability of its somewhat unpredictable 
neighbor North Korea. The temptation for Japan’s government to direct vast resources 
toward quickly building nuclear weapons is a possibility. Due to the cost of this build-up, 
massive neglect to Japan’s domestic aging dilemma and the consequent funding needs 
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could result. Second, Japan is obligated, by Article 9, in its constitution, to refrain from 
building any military beyond its defense force, despite the concern that the U.S. may not 
be able to continue its full support as well as the potential threat of a rising Chia. If this 
agreement with the U.S. were to change, Japan would be left to an insufficient depleting 
youth cohort to try to build up its offensive military.  
Global and Regional Leadership 
 Since World War II, many industrialized countries have benefited from their 
demographic bonus. With a growing workforce, resulting from the post- World War II 
“baby boom,” the US, France, Germany, Japan and others have been able to grow their 
economies. This is indicated by an increase in each state’s GDP, as well as an increase in 
the size of the middle class. These economic advantages have led these countries t 
positions of global leadership in various international institutions. As these leading 
countries experience a demographic onus of shrinking labor and overwhelming domestic 
commitments, the possibility for changes in global leadership capabilities could occur. 
 Regional integration is occurring with examples such as the EU and growing 
Northeast Asian coalitions especially in regards to climate change. The fiscal strain that 
aging populations place on countries, however, could restrict regional leadership 
capabilities. In addition, Northeast Asia countries still have deep imbedded resistance. 
This resistance is evident in recent border disputes, and some believe lies in old 
unresolved war scars, especially, among and between China, South and North Korea and 
Japan. 
 In the case of Japan, its reputation for protectionist practices in areas of trde, 
whaling and forestry has often been viewed as unfriendly to other countries. Japan has 
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consistently displayed its leadership voice and capabilities through the avenues of 
generous ODA, as well as on the private front through FDI and other monetary means. 
Strong private and government backed R&D successes specifically in areas of science 
and technology have also been a means for Japan to show its regional and global 
leadership capabilites. Japan has been a leader in many of these inter-governmental 
organizations (IGO), yet high deficits and fiscal pressures to address the aging issue, will 
become increasingly difficult to maintain global or even regional leadership through aide 
or technological transfer. 
Generational spending 
 Many societies with aging populations experience political conflict in regard to 
where to allocate the already limited funds for social programs. Governments ar  torn 
between dedicating funds and programs to help the growing elderly population without 
neglecting the younger generation. This younger cohort will ideally be responsible for 
dealing with a country with both a growing aging population and a declining one as well. 
Attention to the younger generation in the form of better education and supportive social 
programs may be equally as necessary as the support for the elderly. 
 Japan presently spends proportionally more on programs for the elderly than on 
programs for the younger generation. Consequently, Japan has witnessed a rise in n 
ambiguous group labeled NEET13 (Not engaged in Employment, Education or Training), 
which constituted 847,000 in 2002 of the population aged 20-30, according to the results 
                                                
13 This term originated in the United Kingdom to describe teenagers that were not in 
education, employment or training and typically came from low-income households and 
less educated (Genda, 2005). 
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of the governments Employment Status Survey (Genda, 2005). Two pieces of legislation 
have been developed in 2003 and 2004 to address this issue. 
Increased Urbanization 
 According to the CIA, “if current trends persist, by 2025 about 57 percent of the 
world’s population will live in urban areas, up from about 50 percent today (CIA Global 
Trends Report, 2008: 23).” Many nations have around 60 percent of the population living 
in urban cities.14 Birth rates are lower in urban areas than in rural areas. Children are 
more of a liability as they are more expensive and not used as an extra set of work hands 
as in the rural setting. Women have more work opportunities that often are accompanied 
by pensions and other retirement-oriented financial support, which does not rely on 
having large numbers of children to finance retirement (Longman, 2010). Rural areas on 
the other hand, usually have two demographic burdens: a higher numbers of both children 
and elderly and a much smaller working population to support both (UNDESA, 2009).  
Social Challenges 
 In addition to economic and political challenges, there are numerous potential 
social challenges as well. Some of these social challenges are an increased burden on 
women, greater expectations from a traditionally retired section of the populatin, new 
family roles and responsibilities within multiple generations, as well as shifts from 
government burden to sharing more of the burden with civil society and individual 
families. 
                                                
14 Japan’s urbanization rate is 67 percent; China’s is 46 percent and projected to rise to 65 
by 2030 (Chinadaily, 2010) 
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Gender 
 Women may feel the weight of the challenge of dealing with these demographic 
issues in the form of the “triple favor.” Many governments including Japan see the 
encouragement of educated non-working women back into the work force as a way to 
deal with the work force shortage, the diminishing contributions needed to uphold 
pension and healthcare systems, as well as boosting economic growth. Most western
aging countries have also engaged in pro-natalist measures. Finally, the third favor that 
potentially will be asked of women is to share the burden of taking care of the elderly in 
the form of filial responsibility.   
 Multi-generational households have traditionally been common in many Asian 
homes, however, in recent decades partially due to urbanization an increase in nuclear 
families has occurred (Kumagai, 2008:11). More people are moving to urban areas for 
employment opportunities and most never return to their land of birth, leaving the parents 
to fend for themselves. In addition to the increase in nuclear families, China has an even 
more troubling phenomenon. As a result of China’s “one-child” policy nearly four 
decades ago, not only do China’s elderly have fewer descendents to serve as caregivers, 
the single children are now growing up in homes with “no siblings; no cousins; no uncles 
or aunts-only ancestors and descendants” (Eberstadt 2011: 10). These trends lead to more 
pressure on women that use to be relieved somewhat by relatives. 
 In order for one or any of these requests upon women to be met, support will need 
to be provided. Support in the form of equal wages, government or company-supported 
childcare, tax breaks and extended social programs. 
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Generational and Family Structure Issues 
 As displayed in France in the summer of 2010, resistance to changing conditions 
for retirees such as increasing the retirement age can be met with strong opp siti n. As of 
yet, the working class in Japan has not protested the increases that will incur in the form 
of higher social security taxes taken from salaries to support the retired generation. Inter-
generational conflict could escalate as governments start to make necessary increases in 
taxes and cuts in pension benefits. Another social issue as mentioned above, will be the 
change in autonomy for younger generations. These changes will occur as single adults or 
nuclear families revert back to multi-generational living conditions, and more parents in 
need of assistance are unable to support themselves. This will lead to this younger 
generation loosing some of their autonomy. 
Other Challenges 
 There are other challenges that are economic, political and social in nature tha ar  
much more difficult to conceptualize any direct response to. These challenges are the
extremely tight budgets that most countries are facing partially due to th present global 
economic crisis, the interconnected phenomena of globalization, and the lack of discourse 
and urgency among politicians to their constituencies about the true nature of these 
demographic conditions and the challenges that is created by them. As for Japan, there is 
the additional challenge of its intricate, complicated political system, where movement on 
these issues can be slowed, blocked or controlled by the inner workings of powerful 
bureaucracies. This paper acknowledges these problems here but admittedly thes issues 
are too vast for the concern of this paper. 
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 The challenges created by aging and declining populations are vast and 
interconnected. They span economic, political and social arenas. Economic challenges 
range from decisions made by governments to increase taxes and/or cut benefits to 
decisions on how to maintain solvent healthcare and pension plans. Shrinking workforces 
appears to be the biggest concern and has often been remedied by loosening immigration 
policy to attract migrant workers. Many countries such as Germany and Frce are 
experiencing resistance from civil society to continue this trend. Some countries may 
start looking internally to fill the labor gap with women and retirees, which will 
potentially lead to challenges regarding gender roles and family structure. 
 The review of these varied and integrated challenges that are expected, partially 
or fully due to demographic drivers indicate that responses are needed. It is also evident 
that there is no silver bullet, no one perfect response that will address all the challenges. 
The various responses as well as the consequent challenges and results are discuss d in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
POTENTIAL RESPONSES   
 This chapter reviews the potential responses to the challenges stemming fro  
aging and declining populations. First, there is a brief examination of the general 
economic responses governments typically implement. Then, three types of responses are 
discussed: immigration, pro-natalist policies and the changing nature of the workforce. 
Finally, an acknowledgement of a few extreme responses is made.  
Economic Responses 
 Economic responses to population aging fall into three basic categories: rais 
taxes, cut retirement benefits, or continue to borrow funds of other states and from future 
generations (Shapiro, 2008). The first two choices put the burden of change on either the 
working or the elderly cohort (which is everyone eventually); the third choice is 
unsustainable, considering that aging populations eventually lead to declining population 
(see Table 2.4), which means a smaller tax base must support a larger elderly population 
and ever-increasing debt. 
 The suggestion of raising taxes or cutting benefits in any country by politicians s 
difficult. Some believe it is a necessity in dealing with population aging and decline. 
Many governments have raised taxes including Japan while the governments of France, 
Germany and Italy have little room for more increase (Shapiro, 2008: 58). Norwegian 
financial experts have recently recommended to its government a tax increase of 12 
percent, needed to “counter the costs of the nations increasingly aging population” 
(Steinhovden, 2010: 1). Steinhovden also refers to a collaborated study by scholars at the 
University of Bergen and the University of Freiburg, which found that the more time that 
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passes, the larger the necessary increase. Israel presents evidence to this as Health 
Minister three years ago proposed a minor 0.3 percent increase to cover rising healthcare 
costs for its aging population to no avail.  Israel’s current Health Minister has made yet 
another similar proposal this time at 0.5 percent (AARP Global Network, 2011). 
Immigration 
Increasing immigration is another approach to dealing with graying and declining 
populations. Increased immigration brings double benefits.  Immigrants tend to fit in
the working-age cohort and they also typically have higher fertility ratesin their countries 
of origin.  But increased immigration is not seen by some to be an ideal solution for many 
countries because increased immigration is often associated with racial and ethnic 
tensions and fears that immigrants dilute the cultures of receiving countries wi h their 
recorded inability to assimilate (Bermingham, 2001).  
Germany and France stand out as two countries with continued persistent 
difficulties with immigrants. Both countries have a growing aging population and 
Germany is projected to have the highest percentage of population decline among 
western European countries. Both countries have been responding to these demographic 
shifts with open immigration policies for decades.  
France has been known for its integrated approach to immigration, with its goal of 
assimilation of all immigrants. France strongly urges its immigrants to leave all cultural 
and ethnic differences behind, once they become French citizens. This has often not been 
possible and sometimes causes unrest as witnessed by the Paris riots among Muslim 
youths in 2005.  
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Germany has tried the path of multiculturalism, specifically concerning its large 
Turkish immigrant population. However, the cleavage between the Muslim immigrants 
and the rest of the German population has been met with frustration as well as a huge 
economic loss. According to Udo Ulfkotte, a German security specialist, as of 2007 
migrants have taken one billion euro more out of the German public funds than they have 
paid into the system, while the present German debt is 1.7 billion euro. Some critics 
blame the lack of integration on the fact that parts of the Koran restrict against it, which 
makes it difficult to educate a population when they are trained to refuse to be taught by 
infidels (Anonymous, 2010). Author, Thilo Sarrazin’s book argues, “that immigrants are 
destroying Germany” (Jacoby, 2011:1).  Political leaders in Germany have denounced the 
book, as they are fully aware of Germany’s growing need for workers. The problem that 
Germany faces is the lack of “skilled” laborers, that are likely not to drain public finds as 
much as “unskilled” laborers. The German government is torn between the growing 
shortage in the workforce and the growing tension regarding immigrants. Germany’s 
leadership voiced the frustration when Angela Merkel announced recently that 
multiculturalism in Germany had “utterly failed” (Chrisafis, 2010: 1).  
 Many other states have opened their borders to working immigrants in order to fill 
the labor gap. Immigration however, has several drawbacks. First, immigrants, 
themselves eventually age, contributing to the raise in the aging population. Second, even 
if immigrants come from a country with a higher than replacement level fertility rate, 
data shows that they tend to converge with the fertility rates of the country ente ed, 
within a generation or two (BBC, 2006; Magnus, 2009: 256).   
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 While Europe as well as the United States has historically filled this labor gap 
with increased immigration, most of these countries are experiencing increased racial and 
ethnic tensions due to lack of assimilation, economic downturn and a rise in 
unemployment. Some states may become motivated to concentrate more within its 
population to increase workers than to continue looking to immigrants. 
Pro-natalist Response 
 It won’t be easy to reverse the demographic momentum that is leading to 
population aging and decline.  The “population bomb” fizzled when couples discovered 
that having fewer children led to a better quality of life.  There are unfortunately no 
similar natural incentives that would encourage people to have more children in declining 
countries. Some countries have created economic incentives, direct cash payments or tax 
breaks, for those willing to have additional children.   
 France’s first policy named the Code de la Famille, passed in 1939, banned the 
sale of contraceptives, provided subsidized holidays and offered cash incentives to 
mothers to stay at home with their children.  The more recent pro-natalist policies in 
France include preferential access to government housing, heavily subsidized childcare 
and tax benefits, and up to 40 weeks maternity leave at nearly full pay for mothers having 
a third child (Kennedy, 2010). More recently, Sweden has been known for a more round-
about way of trying to stimulate birth rates by stressing gender equality and providing a 
mixed package of higher pay for women, more flexible work-hours for both parents and 
high quality childcare.  
These types of government efforts have not always had the desired effects due to 
significant pressures moving in the opposite direction.  An increase in education and 
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career opportunities for women, increased access to birth control and abortion, and a 
significant decrease15 in marriages have combined to cut fertility rates considerably.  In 
addition, abortions have increased in Europe to 1.2 million abortions each year 
(Golubiewski 2008).   
 In Russia, president Putin as well as president Medvedev has supported extensive 
measures to increase fertility rates within the last decade. Thesemeasures range from 
support for foster families, the development of preschool education, the promotion of 
healthy lifestyles and incentive payments for second births. The hope is that the opening 
of more family kindergartens and pre-school facilities will spur the birthrate by 4-5 
percent as well as create jobs. Most recently was a proposed measure to reward families 
with three or more children, with tax breaks and plots of land to build a home. On the 
regional level, some creative incentives have taken place. In Ulyanovsk, a town famous 
for being the birthplace of Vladimir Lenin, September 12th was declared as the Day of 
Conception and for the third year running is giving couples time off from work to 
procreate. Cash incentives and Russian-made SUV’s were given away to citizens who 
gave birth nine months later on Russia’s National holiday. The result of the policies 
implemented in Ulyanovsk produced 46 more babies the first year and 78 more babies, 
the second year (MSNBC, 2007). The government has presented increased births as a 
patriotic act and even show posters depicting a young woman with three babies with 
captions stating, “Love for your nation starts with love for family” (RIA Novosti, 2010: 
2).  
 South Korea had an overly successful family planning campaign to reduce 
                                                
15 Europe has experienced 25 percent decrease in marriages (Golubiewski, 2008).  
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women’s unwanted births a couple of decades ago, when the TFR exceeded 6.0 and is 
now feeling the demographic pains. At that time the South Korean government felt that 
the campaign was seen as essential for economic growth and modernization to be 
achieved. Now that it is achieved, the plans have been reversed with the new Saero-Maji 
(“new beginning”) Plan. The plan’s extensive measures include tax incentives, priority 
for purchasing new apartments, an increase in childcare facilities by 30 percent, as well 
as childcare facilities at work. It also included support for childcare, support for 
education, and assistance to infertile couples. South Korea’s goal is to raise the fertility 
rate from 1.2 to a mere 1.6 by 2020. Surveys show however, that only 65 percent of 
married women feel a need for children, dropping from 90 percent just eight years 
earlier.16 According to Carl Haub, senior demographer at the Population Reference 
Bureau, Korean women do express a desire for two children but with little effect on 
actual fertility. In addition to married women, 49 percent of single women are reluctant to 
get married (Haub, 2010). It remains to be seen if policies to raise fertility rates will be as 
successful as the policies to decrease the same rates were a couple decades ago. 
Changing Nature of the Labor Force 
 Considering the challenges of an ever increasing immigrant population and the 
generations needed to increase a workforce through pro-natalist measures, some countries 
are attempting to reach within their populations for solutions. The un-tapped resources of 
both the younger, healthier retiree population and the non-working female population 
have attracted attention from many governments. In most industrialized countries a good 
proportion of the retiree community could feasible still be productive workers and 
                                                
16 Taken from a survey called “The Basic Plan on Aging Society and Population of 
Korea” (Korean Ministry for Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs, 2010). 
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therefore, aid the challenge simultaneously, in two ways. First, they add numbers to the 
workforce, which increases needed contributions into the pension and healthcare systems. 
Second, they postpone drawing on retirement benefits, which adds some longevity to 
pension funds. 
  In many societies, a good portion of women, traditionally are either periodic part-
time workers or unemployed due to family obligations. Many governments are now 
turning to women for the “triple favor,” asking them to not only help in taking care of the 
growing elderly population and have more children, but also to join the workforce. The 
following sections provide an overview of how these two groups are being encouraged to 
boost the numbers in the workforce. 
Increase women in workforce 
 In many countries women, for a variety of reasons, some cultural, economical and 
personal, are not a permanent part of the full-time work force. There are many challenges 
still remaining in advanced economies regarding gender equality in the workforce as well 
as the logistics of who will tend to the children and elderly. Many states have proposed 
piecemeal legislation to increase gender equality or to provide subsidized ch ldcare. The 
Korean government has gone as far as to enforce a family-friendly corporate certification 
system in 2008. Many corporations have made efforts such as providing child-care 
facilities, offering flexible work hours, and permitting tele working from home (Chung, 
2010). Magnus quotes that, “a modern economy will need to include people with a wider 
mix of skills, more career changes, more options such as flexible hours and extended 
phases of work into full retirement (2009: 55). 
 Many in Japan believe that it’s “greatest hopes for an increase in its workforce are 
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pinned on the utilization of the potential female labor force (Komine and Kabe, 2009: 
29).” Japan has the lowest percentage of working mothers at 30 percent, compared to the 
United States at 54 percent, and the Netherlands at 73 percent, thus processing the largest 
surplus to draw from. The reason for this low percentage is mainly due to the cultural 
dictates on choices for Japanese women. Many women feel they have to choose between
a family and a career, even if they want both. Japan also lacks the proper infrastructure to 
allow women to do both. In Japan, there is childcare available to only 20 percent of the 
women who need it, with well over 20,000 families on waiting lists (Price, 2010). 
Increase retirement age 
 The “Great Recession” of 2008-2010 focused attention on the rapidly growing 
“retirement gap.”  As economic growth stopped and unemployment increased, it became 
obvious that the generous assumptions underlying public and private pension systems in 
industrial countries were faulty, and some politicians attempted to begin to deal with the 
problem.  Thus, in France, a country (in) famous for its 35-hour work-week, long 
vacations and early retirement age, an attempt in 2010 to increase the retirement age a 
mere two years, from 60 to only 62 was met with massive demonstrations.  At present, in 
France the payroll tax supporting this system accounts for 38 percent of the labor costs 
(Shapiro, 2008).  Other European countries face similar, although somewhat less 
extreme, challenges. 
 As previously noted, although, dealing with the issue through retirement policy 
changes, has been met with resistance, the situation may be somewhat mitigated, since 
forecasts based solely on chronological age don’t take account of the fact that “disability-
free” life expectancy is also steadily increasing.  Thus, 65 year olds in industr al countries 
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can now expect to live much longer than they did decades ago.  In 1950 a 65-year old 
woman in the United States, Canada, or Sweden could expect to live only 15 more years.  
By 2000, this had increased to 20 years.  In addition, people 65 and older are now more 
likely to be free of disabilities that would keep them from working.  While some studie  
show that the overall health of the elderly in the United States has reason for concern17, 
other studies have shown that, for example, in the 65-74 age group 14.2 percent were 
disabled in 1982 while only 8.9 percent were disabled in 2004-2005 (Sanderson and 
Scherbov, 2010).  
Thus, although there will still be stiff political resistance in industrial countries o 
increasing retirement ages in the future, there will be a larger pool of able-bodied senior 
citizens from which labor forces can be drawn.  And the costs of medical care for this 
group of “near aged” likely will drop.  In the United States for example, if legislation 
were to be passed increasing the retirement age one-half year for every y ar of additional 
life expectancy at age 65, pressure on the Social Security system would be reduced 
substantially (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2010). A similar situation would exist in other 
countries. 
 Since many governments have started contemplating policies to encourage 
increasing the retirement age, social adjustments necessary to ease the transformation into 
an older workforce will be necessary. Some of the needed changes for these adjustments 
are equity in the workplace considering limited physical ability of elderly workers 
                                                
17 A Rand Corp. study published in Health Affairs states that more than 40 percent of 
Americans ages 50 to 64 already have difficulties performing ordinary activities of daily 
life, such as walking a quarter mile or climbing 10 steps without resting -- a substantial 
rise from just 10 years ago (Longman, 2010: 7). 
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compared to younger ones, flexible working hours, continued education to keep skills 
more equal between generations, and finding an equitable pay scale taking skills and 
experience into consideration.  Ironically, according to the United Nations, “older persons 
remain economically active for longer in less developed regions because of the limited 
coverage of pension programs and relatively small incomes” (UNDESA, 2010: xxix). 
 According to the European Union, Europe views aging not just as a challenge to the 
job market and the social and health systems, but also as a social and economic 
opportunity. The European Commission adopted a European Action Plan for “Ageing 
Well in the Information Society.” This Action Plan targets improving the life of older 
people at home, in the workplace and in society in general. These initiatives will not only 
fund research and development but will aim to provide low cost communications and 
online services that can support the needs of the elderly18 in merging into an information 
society. By boosting technological skills, an increase in the number of elderly who will 
extend their work-life beyond retirement age could be realized. However, if the protest in 
France last summer over a mere two year increase in retirement age from 60 to 62 is any 
indication of the potential resistance that other EU countries may have, then keeping th  
elderly in the workforce, may be difficult. 
 While increasing the retirement age is not unique, civil society in Japan is not l kely 
to organize and demonstrate against such an attempt as was witnessed in France recently 
over an additional two years of work. In 1994, legislation was passed in Japan to 
gradually increase the pension age from 60 to 65 starting in 2001 and ending in 2013 and 
                                                
18 Only 10 percent of older people use the Internet. Severe vision, hearing or dexterity 
problems, frustrate many older peoples' efforts (21 percent of population over 50) to 
engage in the information society (Anonymous, 2007).  
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2018 for men and women respectively. There was no protest witnessed. 
Robotics 
 Robotics is another force that is projected to change the nature of the workforce. 
While many Western countries such as Germany and the US do engage in robotic 
research and development, the leader in robotic technology is Japan. The various aspects 
of how robotics will affect the workforce will be expanded in the next chapter on Japan’s 
responses. 
Extreme responses 
 Thus far, the suggested responses have been considerable, however, it may be 
helpful to also examine a few extreme responses such as the return of Diaspora 
populations, elderly emigration and euthanasia. Although all three of these would be 
suggestions and be ultimately up to the individual, in the absence of convincing 
incentives, other forms of persuasion would border on intrusion of individual rights. 
Therefore, a gentle examination will follow. 
Diaspora Return 
 Diasporas are groups or individuals who choose, or are sometimes forced to live 
outside their ethnic homeland. Japan has a surplus of potential workers that make up it’s 
Diaspora, equaling approximately 2.6 million worldwide; relatively small, compared to 
China’s nearly 40 million. However, that number more than equals the present immigrant 
population in Japan and could potentially boost a shrinking workforce, were it possible to 
lure these nationals back to Japan. 
 There are typically two types diasporic returns. The first type consists of first 
generation nationals who move back to their place of birth. The second type is made up 
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of later generation descendents who may return to the land of their ancestral origin 
(Tsuda, 2009: 1). Japan has already attempted to lure this second type of Diaspora with 
little success.  
 In the 1980’s when Japan’s manufacturing industry was booming the government 
approved a temporary workers program open to ikkeijin (people of Japanese descent), 
primarily from Brazil. This replacement immigration is what many countries, such as 
France, Germany and the U.S., have tried when working population starts to shrink. In 
addition to a shrinking workforce, many advanced economies experience an increase of 
available jobs that educated workers will not do, which increases the labor shortage 
(Harris 2002). In Japan, this phenomenon is called the “three K’s” - kitanai, kitsui and 
kiken (or the three D’s in English-dirty, difficult and dangerous).  These are the types of 
jobs that educated workers tend to avoid (Harris, 2002; Pang, 2000). Typically, these 
positions are occupied by immigrant workers, as is the case in Japan, Spain, Germany, 
France and the United States. 
 Motivation for diasporic returns are predominantly economic pressures (push) or 
economic opportunity (pull) as well as ethnic ties (Tsuda, 2009a: 21). Economic 
opportunity was the pull factor for over 190,000 Brazilian nikkeijin in the 1980’s. This 
program unfortunately was a failure once unemployment began to rise and the workers 
were not needed anymore. It ended in payments being made to the nikkeijin with requests 
to leave Japan and not to come back. 
Emigration of elderly 
 Another extreme response would be the emigration of retirees out of the country 
to eliminate some of that country’s fiscal burden. As problem-filled as this idea may be, 
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Jack Goldstone suggests this “reverse flow of older immigrants from developed to 
developing countries” as a win-win situation. He claims that developing countries would 
receive employment opportunities and valuable training for their younger cohorts and 
developed countries would have some “reduction to the strain on their entitlement 
system”(2010: 43). The obvious problem of the improbability that a large enough number 
of retirees would agree to leave their families, communities and homes to live out their 
days, makes this option quite unfeasible. 
Euthanasia 
 The most extreme response of all is a difficult topic for public discussion. As a 
global society, we have become so dependent and attached to life-saving, life-sustaining 
medication and procedures that the idea of allowing people to die has become inhumane 
and even murderous in some parts of the world. This suspension of life perhaps beyond a 
persons ability to speak or decide for themselves their destiny sometimes result  in 
legally locking them in a position of incompetence to make decisions due to affects of the 
same life-saving, life-sustaining medication and procedures previously accepted by that 
same competent (at that time) person.  
 Euthanasia is considered to be “in conflict with basic ethical principles of medical 
practice” by the world medical community (World Medical Association, 2002: 1). 
Assisted suicides are legal in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and the states of 
Washington and Oregon in the United States. Garrett and Jane Hardin, two population 
giants willingly used this method in 2003. Whether perspectives of Euthanasia and its 
legality will change in a rapidly aging world is yet to be seen. For this paper, it is an 
option far too under-developed to be seriously considered as a response.   
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 Japan blundered once with inadequate conditions for the unfortunate nikkeijin 
therefore it is doubtful the government would attempt such measures again. The 
likelihood of Japan’s ability to persuade first generation Japanese to return to their 
birthplace is unknown. Consequences of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami may act as a 
stimulant to the present diaspora community to return home to assist families. On the 
other hand, the faulty nuclear reactor troubles in Fukushima may cause the opposite 
affect of emigration.  Overall the cost to lure 2.6 million people back to their homeland 
would be quite high and the probability for cooperation by these individuals are likely to 
be low.  The reverse flow of immigrants in the form of the elderly retiring in some sunny 
coastal developing country is also unlikely given the strong culture of family nd 
community ties. Finally, although euthanasia is still illegal, the Japanese Association of 
Acute Medicine has approved euthanasia for terminally ill patients under certain 
conditions (CNA, 2007). Every possible response has obviously not been covered, 
however the most prominent in the literature has been, as well as a few interestig, l s-
explored options that have just been mentioned.  
 The three main responses that this paper focuses on is immigration, pro-natalist 
policies and the changing nature of the workforce. There has been growing resistance to 
continued immigration in many of the Western European aging countries. In the nex  
chapter Japan’s stance on immigration will be explored. Additionally, despite many
efforts by Western governments to boost the “birth dearth,” no positively successful 
approach has evolved. Japan too, explores pro-natalist policies and will be expanded in 
the next chapter. Finally, the increase of female workers, the increase in retiree workers 
and the diffusion of robotics into the workforce are the three types of changes in the labor 
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force focused on in this paper. This next chapter explores Japan’s responses and the 
challenges they pose. 
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CHAPTER 5 
NATURE OF JAPAN’S RESPONSES 
 Recalling the proposed fifth stage of demographic change starting with declining 
TFR, leading to an aging of society, followed by a shrinking of the workforce and 
resulting in total population decline, it is apparent that each of these stages are 
interconnected, yet create different challenges. Although other countries have tried to 
combat declining birthrates and potentially shrinking workforces, Japan does not have an 
example of another developed country that has experience in creating and managing 
systems for a growing aging society as well as dealing with a declining population.  
 If Japan concentrates on increasing the work force through immigration then the 
already limited funds for its growing aging population will decrease in order to fund 
necessary social problems that come with increased immigrant population. If Japan 
continues to fund pro-natalist incentives to only a minimal rise in TFR, then Japan also 
puts its national budget in more risk for only minimal results that may be a generatio  or 
two away. Finally, if Japan focuses on taking care of its aging society, what will its future 
look like? Japan’s approach therefore, to the options brought forth in this paper will need 
to consider all aspects of its demographic position. After a brief examination of Japan’s 
economic responses, a narrower look at immigration, pro-natalist policies, and change in 
the workforce, is made. 
Japan’s Economic Direction 
Tax Increase 
 The portion of payroll tax dedicated to fund pension and social security will 
inevitably grow as each nation ages. Japan comparatively has a little more room to grow 
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in taxes than Europe and the United States. Its tax ratio is relatively lower in both 
personal income tax and taxes on goods and services, and the government was able to 
successfully raise payroll tax and increase benefits, without much fuss from civil 
society.19 Even with these positive aspects some economists believe “it is unlikely to be 
possible to finance this additional expenditure without [additional] tax increases” (Keen, 
2008: 63).  
Cut Benefits 
 The reform legislation passed in 2004 will gradually cut benefits from 59.3 to 
50.2 percent of an earner’s income. Here too, IMF economists believe this reform to be 
an improvement, yet further adjustments are suggested. The introduction of an automatic 
benefits adjustment mechanism, more oversight of private pension plans and more 
supplementation of higher private retirement savings are some of these suggested 
adjustments (Iakova, 2008: 84-91). 
 In addition to public reform, pensions have been reformed recently on the private 
level also. Japan’s corporate environment has been known to be secure for two reasons: 
lifetime job security and decent pensions. However, in 2002, the government started 
allowing companies to cut private pension benefits. In 2010, JAL cuts its pension benefits 
by 50 percent. Several other large companies have plans to follow suit, such as 
Mitsubishi Heavy, NTT and Kinki Nippon Tourist.20 The companies must have two-
thirds support from retirees before receiving clearance to cut benefits. Many retirees have 
                                                
19 In 2004 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi “persuaded Japan’s Diet” to an increase in 
payroll tax from 13.6 to 18.3 as well as a cut in benefits by 20 percent (Shapiro 2008, 70). 
20 Kinki Nippon Tourist, which lost 8 million dollars in 2009, was able to persuade its 
1,400 retirees to take a 10 percent cut in their pensions and the 2,100 current workers to 
accept a similar deal (Clenfield, 2010). 
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complained of being bullied into agreeing, while many still comply due to their 
“emotional connection with people still in the company” (Clenfield, 2010: 1).   
Borrowing Funds 
 Borrowing funds from future generations only continues the burden of sky 
rocketing national debt. According to the CIA fact book nearly all countries already have 
a public debt a good percentage higher than each countries GDP. For example the world 
average public debt is 59.3 percent of global GDP, while Japan tops the list in this 
category as well, with its public debt at 225.8 percent of its GDP, making this option 
unsustainable. 
Immigration 
 Japan traditionally has been viewed as being very tight on immigration even 
during the pre-military era of the Tokugawa period (1603-1868).  Although Japan has 
been famous for its ability to borrow and adapt ideas and institutions it seems to have
drawn the line on people. With the exception of inclusion of the Ainu from Hokkaido and 
Ryuku people from Okinawa during the end of the Tokugawa period, Japan has been very 
closed off to foreigners in comparison to other industrialized states. The largest
populations of foreigners living in Japan are the Chinese numbering 600,000 and the 
Koreans a little less than that, followed by the fairly recent admission  of nikkeijin from 
Latin America. Japan still struggles with its equal treatment of foreigners, as witnessed 
by its treatment to nikkeijin who came to Japan as a guest worker. Some of the unequal 
treatment to these foreigners included inequality in pay, sub-level living conditions, short 
lengths of stay, inability to receive permanent resident status, lack of educational 
opportunities and little integration of children of immigrants into Japanese society.  
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 Japan has also been known as a somewhat controlled mono-ethnic society and its 
policy actions have been interpreted as xenophobic. Some scholars have conducted 
research through content analysis in attempts to show that Japan is moving from a mono-
ethnic society to a multi-cultural one (Tai, 2009). This however, is not the consensus 
either in the literature or in the actions of the government regarding immigration policy 
(Bermingham, 2001; Hockstader, 2010). According to the Japan Times, not only does 
“government marginalize the existing foreign population by running absurd campaigns 
against foreign crime and refusing to enact the most basic of human rights21 legi lation 
for foreigners, but laws are passed only to control foreigners and none to protect them” 
(Brophy and Arudou, 2004). 
 The long run of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) over the last five decades has 
been highlighted as being pro-business, while keeping the government budget typically 
low. The LDP was known to “coddle [d] many producer groups with cartel-like 
legislation and other policy favors” (Rosenbluth, 2007:12). With sustained relationships 
between the political system and businesses, it appears that if businesses were in ne d of 
labor, skilled or unskilled, the government entities would oblige. 
 For example, when Japan experienced economic growth in the 1980’s the 
temporary guest workers program was devised under the auspices of a “training” 
program, with pro-business conditions that bordered on violating human rights and put a 
wedge in wages between the pay received by immigrant “trainees” and Japanese workers. 
                                                
21 Some immigrants arriving on “training visas” (190,000) are subjected to 16-hour days, 
below minimum wage, battle factory fumes and little training or legal protecti n.127 of 
the trainees have died since program started. The UN has urged Japan to scrap the 
“training Program” (Tabuchi, 2010). 
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The guest workers, with Japanese ancestry (nikkeijin) typically from Latin American 
countries, were paid a “training” wage, which gave businesses an economic advantage, 
when these same workers were actually doing work. Another advantage for businesse  
was the limit of two years length of stay, allowing firms, as well as localand national 
governments to not carry the cost of assimilating these immigrants into society. Thus, 
long-term health and retirement benefits were not offered, housing was often sub-
standard and families often did not accompany the workers, therefore social programs to 
assimilate children into schools were avoided.   
 Germany had a similar experience when its economy started to grow in the 
1960’s. There was an influx of immigrant workers from Turkey. They never “imagined 
that they would actually settle down in Germany with its high cost of living” (Shimada, 
1994:10). In Japan’s case, by limiting the nikkeijin-trainee workers to two years, the 
government could essentially maintain control of the flow of immigrants. As it happened, 
additional illegal immigrants increased as the demand for jobs increased. In the e d, 
when the workers that had entered legally were no longer needed they were paid to le ve 
and asked not to come back, thus avoiding Germany’s dilemma. 
 The pressure to dissolve this temporary training problem likely came from several 
factors, such as a rise in unemployment and a slow-down in economic growth. Another 
condition occurred in the late 1980’s when attention was made to the increase in illegal 
immigrants that followed the demand for workers. Pressure for an amendment of the 
Immigration Law “came from public concern over the foreign worker problem, which 
escalated to serious proportions during the late 1980’s” (Shimada, 1994:61). Civil 
Society, in this case, pressured politicians based on fear of increased crim, potentially 
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due to low wages and poor living conditions, as well as the increase of un-assimilated 
illegal workers and their families. This change in policy could have come from the public 
against the wishes of these firms. However, more likely this transition was simultaneous 
to the change in these manufacturing firms that hired these workers, moving their 
operations out of Japan. 
 This “hollowing out” period leads to an examination of the reaction of unions, 
another potential force of resistance to immigrant workers. It seems likely that unions 
could oppose an increase of immigrant workers in order to protect their jobs. The nursing
union is one example of this opposing force as evidenced by requesting difficult testing
for foreign nurses. However, according to Leonard J.Schoppa, on a macro-level 
“Japanese labor unions have yet to take a lead in accusing firms of exporting jobs through 
overseas investment” (2006:109). He points to the lack of any mention of the “hollowing 
out” issue in the annual two-hundred-page policy statement issued by Japan’s largest 
union federation, Rengo, in 2003. He attributes this lack of resistance to the commitment 
of firms to adhere to its promise of lifetime employment as one of the possibilities.  
 Although there is no doubt that changes are occurring and range from benefit 
cutting as seen by companies like JAL and Kinetsu, to compromises such asallowing 
workers who reach retirement age to be rehired at a lower wage with partial benefits. The 
conglomerate, Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC), which took actions as the steel industry 
shifted its product, its volume and increased efficiency resulting in what could have been 
massive lay-offs, is one creative example of this. Instead NSC moved from 79,000 
employees in its peak in 1970, when it merged Fuji and Yawata, to 17,000 workers in 
2002 without “summary dismissals and mass discharge” (Abegglen, 2006:43). This was 
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accomplished largely through natural attrition as workers retired each year their numbers 
were not replaced. In addition, many firms started diversifying and assigned their workers 
to subsidiary and affiliated organization-shukko. 
 Thus, firms may not need immigrant unskilled workers at least in the 
manufacturing sector due to hollowing out. Civil Society may resist increased immigrant 
due to fear of the problems perceived or real experience from the temporary workers in 
the 1980’s and its ensuing increase of illegal immigrants. Politicians may anticip te this 
reaction by their constituents and choose not to take action to increase immigrant 
workers. And although unions as a whole have not resisted, the opposition shown by the 
nursing sector is real. 
 For over a decade, there have been many suggestions to loosen immigration 
policy in Japan in order to deal with the shrinking workforce and eventual population 
decline (Sawa, 2010). Many of these suggestions have come from outside institutions 
such as the United Nations. However, much of the domestic rhetoric from Japanese 
politicians has been the opposite. A Regional Immigration Bureau official, Minoru 
Tanaka was quoted as saying, that “if unskilled foreign laborers are allowed into Japan, it 
will lead to total chaos (Terry, 2002: 1).” Taro Aso, the 2005 Foreign Minister, has been 
known to speak of the country as “one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture 
and one race (Japan Times, 2005:1).” Even the Democratic Party of Japan, which came to
power in the summer of 2009, has had plenty to say about population decline, but 
immigration is barely spoke of (Hockstader, 2010). 
 In addition, the most recent public opinions polls show that well over the majority 
of the population feel immigrant workers should only be admitted “as long as jobs [are] 
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available” or with “strict limits” (World Value Survey, 2005). When the survey question 
results are separated into age cohorts, there is a slight increase among the older 
population that believe in strict limits, however overall more than 90 percent of the age 
cohorts agreed with one of those two responses (see Table 5.1). 
 After more than a decade of debating the need to loosen immigration policy, two 
fundamental laws have been implemented. In 2009, the Immigration Bureau of the 
Ministry of Justice implemented two acts, with the abbreviated names of the 
“Immigration Control Act” and the “Alien Registration Act.” The “Immigration Control 
Act” introduces a new system of residence management through an issuance of new 
residence cards administrated and controlled by the Immigration Bureau, as opposed to 
being controlled by local governments. The “Alien Registration Act” forces all aliens to 
register under this new system.  Although there has been much discourse in the past 
decade or two regarding the impending shortage of workers and the necessity to open 
Japan’s border to foreign workers, the purpose in these two acts are clear that Jpan has 
not the intention of loosening borders, but quite the opposite. Both of these acts simply 
address process issues of entry, deportation and procedures. There is no mechanism to 
increase the number of legal immigrants into Japan. If anything, these can be used to
tighten measures and numbers. 
 There have been some minimal efforts to open selective areas up to immigrants, 
such as Indonesian and Filipino 22 caretakers, and possibly some more nursing personnel. 
Japan is also considering removing the limit on the length of stays of foreign dentists, 
                                                
22 Countries with Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA’s) 
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which is currently 6-7 years. However, these measures have many restrictions, which 
create  
 
Table 5.1 Japan’s Public Opinion on Immigration Policy 
Immigrant Policy Total 
15-29 
years 
30-49 
years 
50 and 
over 
Let anyone come 2.90% 4.70% 3.20% 2.00% 
As long as jobs available 42.40% 52.40% 49.10% 34.30% 
Strict limits 50.10% 39.40% 43.90% 58.20% 
Prohibit people from coming 4.60% 3.50% 3.80% 5.50% 
Source: World Values Survey 2005         
 
  
very limited admission. For example, Indonesian and Filipino caretakers must pass a
tough licensing exam given only in Japanese. With a limit of 1000 caretakers admitted 
annually, the first group of tested caretakers produced only a couple dozen who passed 
the exam (Tabuchi, 2011). Although the present Prime Minister, Naoto Kan announced in 
February 2011 a plan for a more open Japan, there was no mention of loosening 
immigration policies.  
Pro-Natalist Policies 
 In the mid 1990’s Japan experienced what the government coined the “1.57 
Shock.” This was when the government began to see low TFR as a social problem. Japan 
echoes other countries in its attempt to raise fertility rates with lump-sums for new births 
equaling around $6,000, free tuition for high school and greater spending on sorely 
needed childcare facilities (Wakabayashi and Inada, 2009). In addition, during the brief 
Hatoyama administration, the new Prime Minister was able to pass new legislation 
allowing for couples with small children, to receive a monthly allowance totaling over 
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$3,000.00 annually, until the child reaches 15 years of age, state-supported day care, and 
tuition wavers (Japan Times, 2010; Wakabayashi and Inada, 2009).  
 Other countries such as France, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands have 
previously offered such economic inducements. According to Wakabayashi and Inada, 
the “results have been mixed, dividing researchers who study government enticemets” 
(2009:1). As other industrialized states are finding out, it is not as easy to change a 
family’s choice to have more children merely by a payment of cash. Money ca go only 
so far. Patricia Boling, a women’s study specialist claims that, “in eco omies where 
women are forced to choose between, having kids or having a good job, they are 
increasingly deciding on jobs not kids” (Wakabayashi and Inada, 2009:1). Even if any of 
these attempted incentives were successful it would take a full generatio  to realize an 
increase in birth rates (Bermingham, 2001). 
 Whether the various governmental pro-natalist measures are effective is still 
unclear and it may be too soon to answer. Studies by Guy Laroque and Bernard Salanie,
which studied the results of France’s pro-natalist policies, show that financial incentives 
are higher for first-born children, and in fact are zero for births of rank three or more. 
Their studies have also agonized over isolating causal factors for changes in fertility rates 
(2003, 2005). One study suggests that, even when cash allowances are boosted by 25 
percent, the fertility rate may climb as little as 0.6 percent. Moreover, th  temporal lag in 
this approach is at best a long-term approach to a short-term dilemma. According t the 
CIA Global Trends Report, “large and sustained increases in the fertility rate, even if they 
began now, would not reverse the aging trend for decades in Europe and Japan” (2008: 
21). One thing is clear and that is the attempt to reverse this decline so far sh ws no signs 
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of success.23 
 There is an initiative headed by Japan in coordination with the United Nations and a 
few other countries, which could possibly reverse this trend. This “Satoyama” Initi tive 
promotes resource management and land use with a strong interaction between human 
lifestyles and the natural world. The intent of the project is to create pilot projects of 
sustainable communities that could serve as an example of better natural resource 
management and increase rural living. Some regions such as Hokkaido have recorded 
higher drops in rural population. Measures as extreme as giving land away to young 
couples to settle and build homes, have been tried in order to reverse urbanization 
(Onishi, 2008). It is possible that if reverse urbanization actually occurs, thee could be 
an increase in birthrates as agrarian families have a need for more children to help work 
the land.  
 Population aging and decline, although related, require different responses. 
Japan’s ability to deal with decline in total population is not as promising as its ability to 
deal with an aging population. Japan’s resistance to loosen immigration policy as well
the historical lack of success of pro-natalists policy in other countries, ar  proof of this. 
The responses to the challenges of graying, however, are quite visible in Japan’s natio al 
rhetoric and actions. The changing nature of the labor force is evidence of these 
responses, where an increase in elderly workers, female workers and robotic technology 
are set to change the economic, political and social conditions of this era. 
                                                
23 There is “no consensus among policymakers or demographers about what policies best 
encourage fertility” (Goldstone, 2010: 420). 
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The Changing Nature of Labor 
Addressing graying by using these untapped resources may likely be politically 
unpopular, however compared to a massive influx of immigrants and the risk of diluting 
Japan’s culture, it may be a more preferred option. A good portion of the retired could 
feasibly remain productive workers, adding numbers to the workforce and easing 
pressures on retirement systems by deferring pension obligations. The World Health 
Organization has developed a Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE) indicator, 
based on the expected number of years lived in full health. Japan has the highest ranking 
of 74.5 years, followed by Australia with 73.5 and close to a dozen European countries 
around 72 years of age (AORN, 2000). Encouraging the participation of women who 
have been absent from the labor force is another viable option. These two measures 
would require social adjustments to facilitate the transformation of the workforce.  
Continuing education obviously would be required to keep older workers and previously 
non-working women familiar with new technologies and flexible working hours would 
make continued working more attractive to older workers and women. 
Women in the Workforce 
 Japan’s work culture has been historically male-dominated and there are many 
aspects that would need to be attended to, to make returning to work an attractive option 
for women. Women are often placed in gender positions nicknamed “OL” (Office Lady), 
doing menial jobs like “Ochakumi,” the mandatory serving of tea to guests and 
colleagues, done only by women (Fukuma 1996). Although Japan has moved from the 
101st ranking on the gender gap report to the 94th position, the average pay still is a little 
less than 65 cents to every dollar a man earns, for the same work. If the government or 
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the private sector hopes for cooperation from women, they still have a long way to go 
toward gender equality (Hausmann, Tyson and Zahidi, 2010).  
 There are signs, however that Japan is trying to move from a male-oriented 
corporate culture to more gender equality. There have been a number of pieces of 
legislation passed since the mid-1990’s, encouraging equality in the workforce (see Table 
5.2). These measures include general provisions against discrimination, addressing 
increased symmetry  
 
Table 5.2 Gender-Equality Legislation 
Year Policy Name or Event Approached 
1985 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law (EEOL) 
Prohibits against discrimination in lay-
offs and resignation 
1990 "1.57 shock" 
Heightened awareness of decreasing 
birthrate 
1992 Childcare Leave Law  
1994 Angel Plan 
Expand childcare to children under 3 
Increase childcare facilities 
1996 Plan for Gender Equality 2000 
Created:  
Headquarters for the Promotion of 
Gender Equality  
Gender Equality Bureau 
Council for Gender Equality 
1999 
Basic Plan for Gender Equality 
Society Revision of EEOL 
1999 
Basic Plan for the Promotion of 
Measures for the Declining Birth 
Rate 
Addresses balancing child rearing and 
part time work 
1999 New Angel Plan 
Improve childcare  
Employment opportunities  
Mother-child insurance, consultation and 
education 
2002 Plus One 
Looked at work-style for men 
Provides community support for child-
rearing 
2003 
Law for Measures to Support the 
Development of the Next 
Generation Provides support for the Next Generation 
2004 New-New Angel Plan Supports the autonomy of young people 
Source: Mori and Scearse, 2010 
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among genders both at work and at home and specific measures such as increase 
childcare, mother-child insurance and consultation services. There has also been a 
marked increase of women business owners in Japan. According to a survey of women 
company presidents by Teikoku Databank, businesses run by women are now numbering 
65,452 (Tamura, 2010).24  
 Japan, unlike other advanced economies, has an unusual trend for female 
employment known as the “M” curve (see Figure 5.1). The typical increase in female 
labor participation happens in late teens through mid-twenties, as in other countries, 
forming the first hump of the “M”, followed by a steady decline where Japanese wom n 
have tended to quit work upon marriage or the birth of their first child. Many women 
never return to work 
and the rest show a gradual incline and typically still only part-time or temporary work. 
Therefore, Japan has a large resource of non-working educated women to pull from 
which could aid in increasing the workforce. Japan has the lowest percentage of working 
mothers at 30 percent, compared the US at 54 percent and the Netherlands at 73 percent 
(Wakabayashi and Inada, 2009). This translates to a surplus in Japan of 70 percent of 
mothers who could potentially add to the work force. 
 Whether the effort is to encourage families to have more children or encourage 
women back into the work force, there are other factors that need to be considered. Some 
of those factors are more supportive corporate culture, adequate childcare faciliti s nd 
greater roles for fathers at home. These factors continue to be examined by government 
                                                
24 This figure does not include sole proprietors. 
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ministries, such as the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labor as well as research think 
tanks and non-profit organizations (NPO). 
 An array of policies, plans and promises were almost annually discussed, 
approved and proclaimed since the “1.57’ shock in the mid-1990’s (see Table 5.2). Many 
included an expansion of an already bureaucratic-heavy government from establishing 
headquarters,  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Japan’s “M” Curve 
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councils and bureaus for Gender Equality,25 to commissioning committees to address 
how to counter falling birthrates, reduce anxiety and strengthen young people’s 
autonomy.26   
 There have also been attempts encouraging women back to universities and 
colleges for “Recurrent Education-Reemployment” programs. Typically these programs 
involve crash courses in current events, business English, recent technology and a choice 
of accounting or marketing refresher courses. The program is subsidized by the 
government and lasts a year. The pilot program drew the interest of 200 schools 
throughout Japan in the first year. By the third and final year only three institutions 
remained.  Without providing mother’s with adequate infrastructure such as childcare and 
flexible hours, these women remained limited in their ability to work or attend school, 
and thus the program attracted very few participants. 
 The main obstacles holding mothers back from returning to the work force is the 
lack of sufficient childcare facilities, especially geared toward children under three years 
of age. There are long waiting lists for day care facilities with more demand in the urban 
regions (Wakabayashi and Inada, 2009). Although many companies have plans to build 
internal childcare facility or subsidize baby-sitting services, “20,000 additional child day-
care centers are required between 2011 and 2020 in order to maintain the current labor 
workforce” (Price, 2010: 21).   
 A second obstacle for women is the absence of help with housework and child 
rearing. Research shows that Japanese men contribute less time toward these activities 
                                                
25 Plan for Gender Equality 2000 
26 In 2006 a special committee released a reform policy relating to the concern that the 
main reason young people were remaining single was a lack of hope regarding ceer 
options (Schad-Seifert 2006). 
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than in any other nation. The average amount of help from husbands per week is only 20 
minutes (Price, 2010). Policies such as the New Angel Plan and Plus One, have included 
encouraging equality in child rearing. One NPO called Fathering Japan acce ts this 
equality by training men in various areas of child rearing.  
Raising the Retirement Age 
 In 1994 legislation was passed in Japan to gradually increase the pension age 
from 60 to 65 starting in 2001 and ending in 2013 and 2018 for men and women 
respectively. The timeframe for this policy from start to finish took 26 years. The U.S. 
passed a similar amendment to the Social Security Act in 1983 to increase benefit age by 
only two years over a 27-year period. The Association for the Advancement of Retired 
Persons (AARP) has calculated the suggested retirement age requirement to mai tain 
1995 age dependency ratios for Japan and other Western countries. All countries studied 
would require a retirement age of 72 and above, with Germany, Italy and Japan’s age 
topping the list at 77 years of age. AARP goes on to suggest that Japan would only have a 
couple of decades to increase its pension age an additional 12 years, as well as its 
mandatory retirement age (Rix, 2000).  
 More recently, legislation has been passed to encourage companies to offer 
programs that provide continued employment, but at lower wage rates and with limited
benefits (Abegglen, 2006).  “Soft” measures have also been encouraged in the way of 
incentives to employers to encourage increasing the retirement age from the minimu  
statutory retirement age of 60 to 65 or even 70. Considering Japan’s high life expectancy 
rate, as previously indicated by the WHO ratings, as well as general healthy habits of the 
elderly population due to good diet and consistent exercise and a strong work ethic, this 
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seems to be a potential source for workers. Statistics show that the longer people work, 
the longer they remain mentally and physically fit (Morrow-Howell, 2000). According to 
the Research Institute for High-Life, more “seniors” who once retired at age 65 are still 
very active in the workforce. Labor force participation at ages 60-64 and 65 and over are 
70.9 percent and 29.2 percent respectively compared to the US at 58.6 percent and 20.3 
percent and France at 19.5 percent and 1.6 percent (Matsuura, 2009: 1). With new 
innovations, including robotics, Japan could remain productive and dynamic.  
Robotic Labor 
 The use of robots to replace people in the workforce is a potential aid to aging 
populations. As well as filling in the labor gap, robots can also improve the efficiency 
and productivity in the workplace. While robots will not increase the contributions into 
pension and healthcare systems they will not subtract from those systems. The diffusion 
of robotics into industries would come at an initial high cost, but once the costs reach 
parity, there could be increased benefits. 
 Japan has been leading research and development for several decades in the area 
of assistive robotic technologies. These technologies are geared toward rehabilitation and 
social interactions. The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, New Zealand and the United States 
are also participating in this type of research (Mori and Scearce, 2010).  
 Robotic technology is an extremely optimistic response to the challenges of a 
shrinking work force. This could assist in many areas especially in aiding a growin  
aging population. The general psychology of Japan in regards to its distinction between 
the animate and inanimate shows a willing match for this industry to prosper. Trendse 
magazine reported: 
76 
 
The Shinto religion does not draw the same distinctions between the 
animate and inanimate that people in the West do. The Japanese have no 
trouble imagining a robot that can think and feel. Moreover, 370,000 
robots, about 40% of the robots in the world were already at work in 
Japanese factories by 2005. Japan's trade ministry issued a national 
technology roadmap calling for a million industrial robots to be at work 
throughout the country by 2025. Each robot would replace 10 employees, 
so that number would replace 15% of the workforce (Anonymous, 2008). 
 
Increased robotics can replace workers, but also can increase efficiency in the work place 
and in individual lives, which would additionally aid the work force shortage. Robotics 
can range from sociable technologies, to hybrid-assisted limbs (HAL), to humanoids 
aimed at relieving humans of repetitive manual labor.  
 Sociable technologies first appeared as toys, however, future prospects could be 
potential nannies, teachers, therapists, life coaches and caretakers for the elderly 
(Brockman, 2010). Some studies have been done to see if these therapy robots acting as 
mechanical companions assist the patients in feeling better. They have shown to increase 
hormone levels, which leads to less stress (Sugimoto, 2010).  
 Hybrid Assisted Limbs (HAL) and the “power assist” robot suits work like 
exoskeletons and amplify the muscle power of its wearer’s legs and arms. Since over half 
of the agricultural population is 65 and older, these technologies could assist the elderly 
in working longer and help aid the nation’s agricultural sector by increasing efficiency 
and farmers profits (Yomiuri, 2010). The robots that can most affect the emerging 
industry of healthcare are robots that take some of the strain off nurses, such as “The
Robot for Interactive Body Assistance,” which can lift and move patients (Dean 2009). 
Robotic nurses can assist in evaluating the physical condition of its patients based on 
posture and movements recorded by a camera. If signs appear that urgent help is needed 
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such machines are able to call an ambulance. There are robots that can lend a stable h nd 
to be fed by, ones that can turn pages of a book, do simple cleaning and operation of 
other machines and even robots that can talk, laugh, cry and sing.  
 Japanese companies have about 70 percent of the global robot market. The 
Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry plan to support the robot industry and have been 
dedicating large financial support to the research and development of robotics (Mori and 
Scearce, 2010). The robot market is expected to increase from about one trillion yen t  
nearly ten trillion yen by 2035 (Yomiuri, 2010). 
 The nature of Japan’s direction in dealing with these issues appears to focus on 
coping with domestic balance of both workforce and the pension systems more than 
dealing with population decline. Despite previous examples by Western countries of 
expanding labor forces through increased immigration, Japan for various reasons 
presented earlier does not appear to take this direction except for a very limited form. In 
regards to pro-natalist policy western countries have yet to supply a successf l example 
for Japan to follow. Although Japan has tried piecemeal measures of increasing childcare, 
child allowances and attempts to improve working conditions for mothers, with the 
underlying hope of an increase in fertility rates, these measures do not indica e a potential 
increase in births. Therefore, intentional or not, Japan is indicating that the acceptan e of 
population decline is its destiny and have focused their energy on the balance of its 
domestic situation.   
 The changing nature of the work force in Japan will involve an increase of 
previously non-working women (primarily mothers), elderly near or beyond retirement 
age, and robotics as a replacement to humans or in an assistive role. These changes can 
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create consequent social challenges such as the need to redefine gender rol s and a re-
evaluation of family structure and multi-generational living. How Japan’s government, 
firms, families and individuals deal and adjust to the “triple favor” imposed on women, 
the potential forced increase back to multi-generational families, and the replacement of 
family members or health assistants by robots is yet to be seen. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 As this paper has brought forth, Japan has many challenges to deal with stemming 
from the demographic drivers of population aging and decline. As stated earlier, there is 
no silver bullet. A combination of responses approaching these challenges is a more 
likely response. After making some simple observations regarding the fifth stage of the 
demographic transition, I will re-visit the three research questions and attempt o answer 
them. 
Observations for a Fifth Stage 
 After examining the growing group of countries experiencing the demographic 
shifts of population aging and decline we have begun to understand the dynamic 
relationship between birthrates, life expectancy rates and societies. Komine and Kabe’s 
order in demographic shifts that started with a decline in total fertility ate (TFR), then a 
growth in the elderly population, followed by a shrinking work force and then ultimately 
resulting in total population decline, was used to examine these countries affected. First, 
consistent with Komine and Kabe’s work, all countries that are experiencing either 
graying or population decline have below replacement level fertility rates. S cond, 
anomalies are present where some populations decline before a considerable growth in 
the elderly population occurs as in Russia’s case. Alternatively, in the case of the Uni ed 
States, the elderly population is expected to grow without a population decline. Third, 
regardless of the rate of aging or decline, all of the countries examined in this thesis are 
expected to have less than 3 workers supporting one elderly and the majority will likely 
only have two or less workers per retiree within the next couple of decades. 
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 Thus, the thesis indicates that many countries are in a fifth stage of the 
demographic transition. The four conditions Japan has followed are not consistent among 
all affected countries. Two important findings are apparent. First, each country has a 
unique experience of this fifth stage. Although all of the affected countries start with a 
below replacement level TFR, some then have growing aging populations, some have 
population decline, and some experience both. All the affected countries are expected to 
have declining workforces in the coming decades. The second finding this study makes 
clear is that there is no “end state” similar to the equilibrium projected in earl er 
demographic transition models.  
 The relevance of this analysis is that many countries examined in this paper can 
use this sequence as a harbinger of conditions to come. If these countries engage in 
anticipatory thinking, planning for the future will be vital. If states like Russia or Eastern 
European states continue to spend time, resources and policy on attempting to increase
the population only to have an even more precarious problem of graying shortly 
following, then it would be more advantageous for these countries to immediately strt 
changing the labor system and social programs. 
Japan’s Focus 
 This paper has presented the varied and integrated responses being attempted or 
considered as a means to deal with the challenges of population aging and decline. It has 
appeared that while Japan is ahead of other countries in the growing variables impacting 
population aging and decline, the various actors as a whole are moving toward policy and 
response to dealing with primarily the aging population. Immigration and pro-natalist 
measures are two areas that attempt to increase population, thus dealing with population 
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decline. Increased immigration has not been favorable. As this study shows the only 
legislation passed within the last decade regarding immigration was the “Immigration 
Control Act” and the “Alien Registration Act.” Both of these acts aimed at tigh ening 
immigration policy, not loosening. Pro-natalist measures have been tried and while it is 
too early to tell, there have been no precedent in other countries that indicate a sufficient 
increase. 
 While population aging and decline are related issues, they create different 
dilemmas, such as a shrinking work force, total population decline and lack of necessary 
economic and societal infrastructure to support a larger elderly population and therefore 
each requires different solutions. The first research question asks which dilemma(s) are 
the Japanese government, bureaucracies and business’ focusing on and to what degree? It 
appears since Japan is not making progress in increasing its population through either 
immigration or pro-natalist policies that the focus is not on total population decline. 
Alternatively, the focus on a shrinking workforce does appear to be where Japan is 
focusing its energy. This is demonstrated by the numerous pieces of legislation passed in 
the last decade or two in the attempt to increase women in the workforce (see Table 5.2). 
Also, both businesses and governments have made moves to increase the retirement age 
and pension age enabling more elderly workers.  
Changing Nature of the Labor Force 
 This paper looked closer at the changing nature of the work force in Japan. In 
answer to the question regarding the ways in which the labor force is changing, this study 
finds three important changes. These changes include increased use of robotics, and an 
increase of women and elderly workers.   
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 The increase in robotics in the workforce will have a definite impact on the 
shrinking workforce dilemma. The estimate is that one robot could replace 10 employees 
and essentially replace 15 percent of the workforce. This could be in a direct repla ement 
of humans in the form of humanoids or therapeutic robotics performing nursing duties or 
aiding the elderly in activities such as eating and lifting. Robotics can also be used in 
attempts to increase efficiency of workers who remain in the workforce beyond present 
retirement age with the aid HAL attachments. This type of response will most likely be 
motivated by the market, however, government assistance in the form of research and 
development support and subsidies will have an affect on its scope and effectiveness. 
 Japan’s surplus of educated women, who for cultural and economic reasons often 
have withdrawn from the workforce, are now being encouraged to support the shrinking 
workforce in hopes of boosting economic growth, raising contributions to the social 
security system as well as increasing innovation. The success of this direction is highly 
connected to access to adequate childcare, which is sorely missing in Japan, a change in 
corporate and family gender roles and increased participation in childrearing by 
husbands. Many policies have been proclaimed and tried, some successful such as the 
increased entrepreneurship among women, some not as successful such as the “Recurr nt 
Education-Reemployment” program. One point that has not been made yet is the 
potential unintended increase of working women due to increasing financial strains 
caused by the global economic crisis as well as recent natural disaster. Whatever the 
motivating factor there will likely be more women in the Japanese workforce in the next 
coming decades. 
 Increasing elderly in the workforce may not be as abundant as women. This is not 
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due to inability or willingness. It is due to the fact that already a large percnt of elderly 
still work beyond retirement age. With the labor force participation at ages 60-64 and 65 
and over at 70.9 percent and 29.2 percent respectively compared to the US at 58.6 percent 
and 20.3 percent and France at 19.5 percent and 1.6 percent, there is less surplus of 
workers to pull from. However, as the elderly population grows that amount will 
increase. Additionally, with new robotic innovations that boost elderly performance, 
Japan could remain productive and dynamic.  
Social Changes 
 How these labor changes could potentially affect family structure, gender roles 
and generational obligations is the last question to be answered. As mentioned earlier 
Japanese wives receive the least amount of childrearing participation from their husbands 
than in other countries. Therefore, with more and more mothers returning to work, more 
women will be in need of childrearing help. Whether this will come from a collective 
change among husbands wanting to participate or a push from businesses encouraging 
fathers to take childcare leave is not known. If no change takes place, a possible increase 
in divorces could occur. Gender roles would also need to change on the corporate level to 
change the “ochakumi”-style work life for women into one more based on gender 
equality. 
 Another area of social change could be demonstrated with nuclear families 
reverting back to multi-generational living conditions. This can aid the public funds by 
extra help in taking care of the elderly that might normally fall under state care. This will 
also deplete younger generations autonomy in regards to choices of living conditions, 
time and resources. With smaller families there are less siblings to share the 
84 
 
responsibility of caretaking of aging parents and grandparents. One last generational 
problem would be in the gradual disappearance of inheritance. Most people will use all 
their savings to support their long lives with less or none to leave as inheritance. 
Other Countries 
 This analysis can be beneficial for other countries that have limited choices t 
respond to population aging. Most countries if motivated can certainly increase the 
pension and retirement age. Japan can serve as a forerunner by providing both successes 
and failures in policy-making. However, admittedly, Japan’s corporate structure has 
mechanism such as lifetime employment and seniority based pay not found in other 
countries.  In addition, the cultural aspect of multi-generational co-habituating, which 
eases the burden of social costs regarding the aging cohorts, is practiced more often in 
Asian countries. Western countries may however use anticipatory thinking and cre te 
incentives for this burden sharing for families that become caregivers.  
 South Korea in particular as well as other Asian countries, however, can leapfrog 
these labor dilemmas and start implementing successful reform, and avoid wasting time 
on unsuccessful measures. The use of this surplus of female workers may not be 
applicable to some of the other countries experiencing a shrinking workforce as many of 
these countries already have a majority of their female population working. South Korea 
is an exception. There is a similar “M” curve trend in South Korea, therefore Japan’s path 
could be useful for in regards to the future female workforce. The struggles that Japan has 
encountered involves changing the corporate culture that allows for more gender equality
in the workforce, while still allowing for flexibility as not to discourage fertility and 
increase in infrastructure, specifically childcare. These struggles and responses may be 
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useful for countries like South Korea with similar conditions, however, further full 
comparative studies would be needed. 
Other Findings  
 On a broader spectrum, this analysis makes clear that these demographic shifts 
have created interdisciplinary problems.  This calls for a need for greater coordinati n 
between the government, economic and social forces and individuals. A new paradigm is 
needed encompassing serious and far-reaching changes in working arrangements, 
lifestyles, including the role of extended family, business practices and government 
policies.  
 Japan’s situation makes clear that by either lack of intention (closed immigration 
policies) or failure of policies (pro-natalist), it will likely be forced to accept population 
decline. This acceptance may lead to a new type of society. In Ted Fishman’ book Shock 
of Gray, he states that, “an aging population inevitably produces a more globalized 
economy, a more feminized and culturally diverse society and a less generous state” 
(Saunders, 2010: 1). While some positive internal conditions may develop along with 
challenges, global relations among graying states are sure to struggle with less capital to 
spend abroad for foreign military or diplomatic purposes. How Japan maneuvers in this 
new aging society can serve as a guide for countries to follow. 
Future Scenarios 
 Japan is on the forefront of revolutionary demographic change. How Japan 
responds to its aging and declining population dilemma is important for the rest of the 
global “north” as well as the majority of developing countries. Reponses by governments, 
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industry and individuals can move a new paradigm forward or assist in creating an 
unsustainable society. Here are two possible scenarios. 
 A pessimistic possibility would be a deepening of the generational divide. A 
struggle for power, resources and capital between generations could lead to 
intergenerational warfare and eventually a decline of the state. A breakdown of the family 
unit could lend to a break of cohesion, culture and societal bonds leading to a rise in 
poverty, and an increase in theft and violence. 
 An optimistic possibility would be a direction toward a new sustainability 
paradigm stressing non-material pleasures and cooperation. An expansion of education 
for all would lead to lifetime learning. More efficiency and innovation in labor and 
industry could sustain the economy. And a return to multi-generational cohabitating, a 
strengthening of community support and participation and a shift to a gentler and wiser 
society could be the beginnings of a new social paradigm.  
Wild Cards 
 Futurists often include “wild cards” when forecasting potential futures (Cornish, 
2004; Shapiro, 2008). These “wild cards” would include events such as war, global 
economic crisis, energy crisis and natural disasters. These events could completely alter a 
nations direction in unexpected ways. It could be said that Japan is partially or fu
experiencing the first three of this last. However, during the final writing of the paper the 
later, natural disaster, has come to the forefront. 
 How Japan and its citizens will react to the Tohoku earthquake and Pacific 
tsunami, as well the ensuing nuclear reactor breakdowns remains to be seen. A sudden 
need for workers may change Japan’s position on admitting immigrant workers. Food 
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shortages may be a catalyst for younger urban dwellers to move to safe rural lands and 
develop “Satoyama”-like communities. If the agrarian sector were to grow, fertility rates 
could have an upward swing. Whether it will lead to state failure or some kind of 
miraculous re-building of Japan remains to be seen. For the present, the issues in this 
report will most certainly take a back seat to the more pressing issues caused by this 
disaster. 
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